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Abstract
Brand loyalty is tightly connected with competition for market share between brands,
as it describes consumers’ willingness to maintain compatibility between subsequent
purchases. Imposed by exogenous or endogenous factors, the reasons for brand loy-
alty can be summarized in the switching cost. However, consumers do not live in
isolation, instead they influence and get influenced by peers. Especially if influence
propagates via “word-of-mouth” and not direct marketing, peer pressure becomes
invaluable as consumers reach for compatibility with other consumers.
The evolution of market share competition can be described by coordination games
played in networks over multiple periods. Consumers, acting as the players of the
coordination game, contemplate the quality of the available choices while being
susceptible at others’ influence. By considering switching costs, inertia in their
actions is also introduced. An important issue therefore arises - if the available
choices are qualitatively similar, how do the switching costs in combination with
network effects affect the competition outcome?
In this thesis, we address this issue by introducing switching costs into the stan-
dard coordination game; the switching cost game thus describes potential losses
inflicted on players by changing - switching - strategies. We particularly concentrate
our efforts on the proportions of strategies at equilibrium. Compared to the cost-free
game, the switching costs are responsible for the emergence of a coexistence region
where all available strategies coexist in equilibrium. Numerical results on various
network structures verified the coexistence outcome, along with the effect of cost
values and their symmetry on the determination of the coexistence limits.
Next, we investigate the monotonicity of the competition evolution. We exploit
the monotonous behaviour of the switching cost game limiting cases over time to
draw an analogy with bootstrap percolation and benefit from existing analytical
methods to calculate their final outcome and create bounds of the general case. We
also show how these bounds depend on the switching costs. Finally, we examine
the effect of switching costs on the critical behaviour of the system by studying the
properties of stable clusters.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
“There are no answers, only choices.”
Stanislaw Lem, Solaris, 1965
Game theory has provided the formalism and the appropriate mathematical struc-
ture to describe strategic decision making. It describes situations where perfectly
rational players interact with a certain purpose in mind. However, it has failed
to successfully describe the outcome of repeated games. In response to this short-
coming, evolutionary game theory has been developed to describe situations where
individuals can make decisions in successive rounds.
In an evolutionary setting of repeated interactions, each interacting individual
faces the dilemma of attending to her selfish interests or opting for a choice that
increases the collective interests. This type of dilemma, where the benefits of egoism
are juxtaposed with the benefits of altruistic behaviour, is called social dilemma.
The study of social dilemmas has shown that, despite the selfish human nature,
cooperative behaviour that increases the social benefit pervades human societies
allowing social norms and conventions to emerge and become established.
Competition between behaviours resulting in the establishment of such norms can
be described by coordination games on an evolutionary setting. The evolutionary
approach of coordination combines the benefits of rationality of game theory and
those of the network setting. Repeated coordination games on a network of inter-
actions describe the competitive forces drawn by the available strategies that shape
15
the evolutionary outcome. The evolutionary outcome can either be a frozen or a
stationary state that describes the proportion of strategies in the network.
Evolutionary game theory considers an infinite population where two agents in-
teract completely at random and update their strategy. This is not the case in real
networks where the agents’ interaction is innately connected with network structure.
In structured networks, there are several factors that determine the rivalry outcome:
the local rule and the neighbourhood at a microscopic level and the network proper-
ties at a macroscopic level. The local rule determines the amount of influence that
a message/product/idea bears, described as “stickiness” by Gladwell in [24].
The fate of the competition is not only determined by its stickiness; it is also
tightly related to the networking links that connect the network members. The
entrant competitor is initially endorsed by a node category called Innovators in [24]
who pass their influence via “word-of-mouth” to other parts of the network. If the
conditions are favourable, the diffusion reaches a tipping point and spreads like fire
burning the largest part of the network.
There are cases that even though the diffusion conditions are favourable, the
users/customers/message bearers appear reluctant to abandon their current ser-
vice/product/opinion and endorse the competitive one. The described inertia can
be imposed by exogenous reasons or endogenously. It can be summarised in both
cases into one term: the switching cost. In this sense, adopting something new not
only involves harvesting the benefits of it, but also facing the costs of abandoning
the status quo. Therefore a new introduction in the network tends to vanish rather
than spread if the switching cost is higher than the benefit in a socio-economic way.
The choice of technological products can also be considered as a version of social
dilemma; the user contemplates the intrinsic quality of the available choices and
occasionally succumbs to the pressure applied by peers. In an economic setting,
switching costs are defined as costs induced if product consumers decide to change
suppliers. More precisely, they describe their unwillingness to do so and for this
reason they also come under the term brand loyalty. Klemperer in [39] describes the
16
different types of switching costs or reasons for brand loyalty, while considering a
perfectly rational competition model. Apart from considering real monetary costs
induced by supplier changes, the author also presents emotional costs as reasons
for non-economic brand loyalty. Psychological costs are usually the reason behind
similar technological choices [10]; in this paper technological adopters stay attached
to an inefficient brand in a two-period competition between two brands.
The competition for market share happens in successive rounds over a significant
period of time, thus moving away from the perfect rationality setting and consid-
ering multi-period models [11]. In a multi-period model with myopic consumers,
switching costs encourage the entry of a new brand in a market already dominated
by one brand, not because switching costs help brands to attract consumers already
attached to one brand, but because they help brands to attract the unattached ones
[20].
Nonetheless, the network of consumers plays an essential role in the evolution of
the market share. Even though the switching costs represent the consumers’ desire
to maintain compatibility between subsequent purchases, compatibility with other
users is expressed by network effects. In [19], the network effects are portrayed as a
reason for deterring new entries in the market and therefore reducing the competition
for market share. In [35] and [76], a product adoption model with positive network
externalities is proposed. In this model, consumers appreciate a product more and
consequently adopt it if the fraction of the population currently using the product
increases.
Conclusively, switching costs and network effects exert a combined influence on
competition that is worth exploring.
1.2 Problem statement
The focus of this thesis is on the switching cost involved in the decision-making
process. Motivated by the switching cost economics literature and the evolutionary
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game theory setting, we aim to investigate the evolution of competition for market
share in the market or in other words, the evolution of coordination between users
of the same product in the network considering the inertia induced by the switching
costs.
We examine networks that are considered static over time, even though we are
aware that social network structure changes constantly. Static networks are a good
approximation of evolving social networks in which network nodes change their be-
haviour faster than they change links. The full knowledge of the network under
study becomes increasingly rare as the network size grows larger and so the most
influential nodes cannot be identified. For this reason, the evolution of coordination
between users is initialised considering that the newly-introduced product is adopted
with uniform probability by every user.
Network nodes are only aware of their direct surroundings and they form their
decisions based on these. The coordination game that models the competitive be-
haviours in a two-player setting is therefore translated into a threshold model in a
neighbourhood setting.
The exogenous activation as well as the threshold fraction are reminiscent of
percolation phenomena in statistical physics. Their analogy allows us to examine the
tipping phenomena that occur in the network by looking into the initial condition
at which the tipping is observed or by examining the properties of clusters formed
by users of the same product.
1.3 Main Contributions
Over the next chapters, we aim to shed light on different angles of the switching cost
effect. We study the switching cost effect through the prism of networked games,
analytical methods and percolation theory. The main contributions of this thesis
span over the next chapters as follows.
• We study the behaviour of the switching cost game on various network struc-
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tures and we observe its equilibrium state on these structures. The numerical
results show that the switching costs are responsible for a coexistence phase
that contains the available strategies in unequal proportions. The range of
initial condition leading to coexistence depends on the cost values, the degree
distribution and the network structure.
• Numerical results show that the time required to reach the equilibrium state
is lower for higher costs, illustrating the inertia introduced by the switching
cost in the strategists’ behaviour. The time to convergence also depends on
the network structure and the degree distribution.
• The general case of the switching cost model studied here, also called non-
progressive, is a combination of two monotonous over time types of dynam-
ics, called progressive. These progressive types of dynamics are reminiscent
of bootstrap percolation and the general case is modelled as a bi-directional
bootstrap percolation process that has either the same or different thresholds
in each direction.
• We prove by induction that the non-progressive outcome is bounded between
the progressive outcomes. We explore via numerical simulations the effect of
switching costs and the network structure on the formation of the boundaries.
• For the progressive dynamics, we apply analytical methods that calculate the
final proportions of the available strategies along with the critical mass and
we compare analytical and numerical results.
• The phase transitions of the switching cost model are examined at the square
lattice for various cases of switching costs and its critical behaviour is compared
with other opinion models. Considering gradient activation, we efficiently
calculate the critical probability pc where a percolating cluster emerges for the
cost values under study. We also study the cluster properties at criticality
by calculating the fractal dimension of the largest cluster and the cluster-size
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distribution providing evidence that the switching cost model belongs to the
same universality class with standard percolation.
1.4 Thesis outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
In Chapter 2, a numerical study of the coordination games with switching costs
presents the effect of switching costs and the network structure on the network
equilibrium and the time required to reach the equilibrium state.
In Chapter 3, the progressive type of dynamics is introduced for the switching
cost game. An overview of the analytical techniques that calculate the outcome of
progressive diffusion processes is given and an analytical and numerical comparison
between progressive and non-progressive dynamics is drawn for the switching cost
game.
In Chapter 4, we examine the phase transitions of the non-progressive switching
cost game at the square lattice. As opposed to the previous chapters where uniform
activation is considered between the nodes, here we consider gradient activation.
Finally, conclusions of our work are presented and future work along with other
perspectives are discussed in Chapter 5.
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2 Networked Coordination Games
with Switching Costs
2.1 Motivation
In Introduction, we mentioned that the consumers’ inertia to switch suppliers rep-
resented by the switching cost affects the competition between firms and along with
network externalities produce a combined effect to the evolution of competition.
For this reason, we use an influence model that incorporates both the switching
cost and the network effects to examine the evolution of competition over multiple
periods. We therefore consider an evolutionary setting and we are mostly interested
in the evolutionary outcome. For this purpose, at first we explore the switching
cost effect on networks with no structural effects. Then we consider more com-
plex network structure and explore what further impact is imposed on the network
equilibrium state and what properties of network structure mitigate or enhance the
switching cost effect.
2.2 Chapter Overview
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.3, relevant literature
about influence models and their impact on the network equilibrium state is pro-
vided. In Section 2.4, the switching cost game that consists the core of our work
is described. In Section 2.5, the main components of our simulation framework are
presented, along with the simulation settings under which we derived our numerical
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results. The effect of switching costs on the network equilibrium state is studied on
random regular graphs in Section 2.6, while the effects of structure are explored in
Section 2.7. The combined effect of structure and switching costs on the time to
reach the equilibrium state is explored in Section 2.8. A variation of the switching
cost game is considered in Section 2.9. Finally, a summary of this chapter is provided
in Section 2.10.
2.3 Relevant Literature
Over recent years, there has been extensive effort to describe the viral marketing
effect where the diffusion of a product makes inroads in the customer network via
word-of-mouth and not direct marketing. Several models have been proposed to
model the diffusion, incorporating various parameters and drawn from various dis-
ciplines. These models try to capture the two most significant parameters of the
diffusion: the intrinsic quality of the competing entities and the network effects.
Starting from the seminal threshold models of Granovetter [27] and Schelling [72],
we move towards the descriptive models of Domingos and Richardson [17], [63] and
various probabilistic and threshold interaction models presented by Kleinberg in
[38].
Threshold models express the bounded rationality of players with the threshold
value representing the vulnerability of players to their neighbourhood influence.
The threshold value can either be a fraction of the neighbourhood [82] or an integer
number [14]. It can be constant for all nodes [5] or it can be drawn from a random
distribution based on the node degree [41]. These models allow the diffusion to
occur in one direction only and for this reason they are called progressive in [38].
The nature of these models allows to construct approximation algorithms that solve
the target-set selection problem or influence maximisation [36], [37].
Coordination games also describe the competition between entities and since the
competition occurs in successive rounds we consider the coordination games in an
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evolutionary setting. The most popular is the standard coordination game intro-
duced by Morris in [52]. This model studied in a network setting is translated into
a threshold model with threshold fraction q. The evolutionary form of games in a
structured network of interactions bears resemblance to non-equilibrium models of
statistical physics [13],[79].
Evolutionary game theory is also tightly connected to the emergence of coop-
eration in networks [61]. One of the mechanisms of cooperation also relevant to
our context is network reciprocity: cooperators survive by forming a cluster and
providing thus enough community support to each other so that opponents cannot
penetrate their cluster [60]. For the same pattern of interaction, the update rule
and the network structure are the factors that affect the equilibrium outcome and
are responsible for the emergence of cooperation. In [64], effects of time and struc-
ture neglected in the replicator dynamics rule are presented, highlighting the need
to consider update rules that relate better to structured populations. For instance,
imperfect imitation - a stochastic version of unconditional imitation - promotes co-
operation on regular graphs and scale-free networks [65]. However, imitation rules
forgo the bounded rationality of players. To better illustrate this, best response is
used instead.
In the case of myopic best response, the network structure does not produce
any effects on the asymptotic behaviour of the system for equal initial proportions
of strategies. It is for unequal initial conditions that the significant differences in
outcome appear [66]. When introducing noise into the myopic best response, the
system converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium [28],[51],[67].
The time to convergence to equilibrium is also of importance. In [51] and [52],
the time to convergence of best-response dynamics is examined with regard to net-
work structure properties, while in [16] cycles and complete graphs are the network
structures that contribute to fast convergence of imitative dynamics.
A more elaborate expression of bounded rationality is via the consideration of
switching costs; in this case, players contemplate potential benefits and losses re-
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garding their decision. Switching costs are introduced in coordination games in
[45],[58] and [59], where a well-mixed evolutionary setting is considered. In [67],
switching costs are introduced in the standard coordination game and their effect
on equilibrium is studied in the random regular graphs and the Bethe lattice. In
this chapter, we provide a more detailed approach to the switching cost effect on
random regular graphs and we also extend this study of equilibrium effect on other
network structures.
2.4 Switching Cost Game
The starting point of our work is the symmetric, two-player, two-strategy, pure
coordination game introduced by Morris [52]. Similar to all coordination games,
A B
A q 0
B 0 1− q
Table 2.1: The standard coordination game.
adoption of the same strategy is more profitable for both players in this game (Table
2.1). If both players adopt strategy A(B), they both receive payoff q (respectively
1 − q), q ∈ [0, 1]. Zero payoff is yielded for both players if they choose opposite
strategies.
The standard coordination game, as the aforementioned game is called, has two
pure Nash equilibria, (A,A) and (B,B) and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,
where both players adopt strategy A with probability 1− q and B with probability
q. The multiple Nash equilibria of a game raise the problem of equilibrium selection
[28]. In case of multiple Nash equilibria, additional criteria such as Pareto-efficiency
and risk-dominance provide guidelines for equilibrium selection. As Pareto-efficient
is considered the equilibrium that maximises both players’ payoff, while as risk-
dominant is considered the equilibrium that minimises the risk taken by one player
in case the other one behaves irrationally.
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For the standard coordination game, depending on the value of q, in particular if
q 6= 0.5, one of the two pure equilibria yields higher payoff to both players than the
other one. The equilibrium that yields higher payoff for both players is the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium whereas the one that yields smaller payoff for both players is
considered as risk-dominant. For q = 0.5, the Pareto-efficient and risk-dominant
equilibria coincide.
Let switching costs cA, cB ∈ [0, 1] be introduced into the standard coordination
game, where cx is the cost paid by x -strategy followers, i.e. x -strategists, as a
penalty for their decision to change strategy [67]. The switching costs illustrate the
penalty imposed for mindset shifts and not for interactions. It is easily derived that
the switching cost game with zero costs and the standard coordination game are
equivalent.
To describe the switching cost game, the payoff matrix in Table 2.1 is divided
into two payoff matrices (Table 2.2). The cost-adjusted payoff matrix at the left
corresponds to the payoff matrix that A-strategists obey, while the one at the right
describes the cost-induced payoffs for B-strategists. The switching costs are consid-
ered to be fixed for all players.
A B
Stay in A q 0
Change to B −cA 1− q − cA
A B
Change to A q − cB −cB
Stay in B 0 1− q
Table 2.2: The switching cost game.
The payoff matrix of the switching cost game depends on the player’s current
strategy. Hence, the switching cost game is different from asymmetric games, where
the payoff matrix depends on the identity of the player.
2.5 Simulations Methodology
The switching cost game describes the impact of available choices on a two-player
basis. The evolutionary outcome, however, is also affected by the update rule and
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the network structure. In this section, we describe these two factors that helped us
build the simulation framework in order to study the switching cost effect.
2.5.1 Update rules
The myopic best-response update rule indicates the strategy that maximises the
player’s payoff at the next time step by taking into consideration the distribution of
strategies in the neighbourhood at the current time step. If we apply the myopic best
response at the switching cost game, we will see that every node updates her strategy
(maintains her current one) at the next time step if the number of disagreeing
strategists in the neighbourhood is above (below) a certain threshold.
Let Xi(t) be a Bernoulli variable that indicates player’s i strategy at time instance
t.
Xi(t) =
 0 if i supports strategy A1 if i supports strategy B
Consider that player i plays the switching cost game with each one of her di
neighbours. We denote the neighbour j of player i by j ∼ i and so the expression∑
j∼i
Xj(t) represents the B-strategists in player’s i neighbourhood, excluding i. The
number of A-neighbours are then calculated as (di −
∑
j∼i
Xj(t)).
Assume that switching costs cA and cB are constant for all players and over time.
If player i supports strategy A at time step t, the myopic best response update rule
leads to strategy change from A to B at time step t+ 1 if the following holds:
q(di −
∑
j∼i
Xj(t)) < −cA(di −
∑
j∼i
Xj(t)) + (1− q − cA)
∑
j∼i
Xj(t),
which is equivalent to:
∑
j∼i
Xj(t) > (q + cA)di (2.1)
Similarly, if player i supports strategy B at time step t, she adopts strategy A at
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time step t+ 1 by following the myopic best response update rule if the following is
true:
(q − cB)(di −
∑
j∼i
Xj(t))− cB
∑
j∼i
Xj(t) > (1− q)
∑
j∼i
Xj(t)
that leads to:
∑
j∼i
Xj(t) < (q − cB)di (2.2)
If the relevant condition is not satisfied, player i decides to maintain her current
opinion for the next time step.
Game dynamics can evolve in a synchronous or asynchronous way independently
of the update rule. In synchronous update, all players in the network update their
strategy at the same time step and the population evolves in successive generations.
In asynchronous update, only one randomly chosen player updates her strategy at
the current time step.
2.5.2 Network structure
By network structure, we define the network of relationships that exist between
the individuals involved in an evolutionary game. Any network structure can be
represented by means of a graph G = (V,E). The members of the network, i.e.
the players or nodes, occupy the set V of graph vertices, while the set E of edges
represents the existence of a social tie between the associated members. For each
vertex i ∈ V , her total number of associations is defined as her degree di, di ≥ 0.
Empirical results about real-world social networks presented in [7], [49], [53], [54],
[83] demonstrate that these networks share a number of universal structural proper-
ties, among which small diameter, high clustering of connectivity and heavy-tailed
degree distribution are the ones taken into consideration for our study.
In this thesis, the graph structure is characterised by the degree distribution. We
examine network models with uniform degree distribution (complete graphs, lattices
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and random regular graphs), as well as networks where the vertex degrees follow a
non-uniform distribution (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Power-Law graphs).
Complete graphs
In complete graphs, all nodes are connected to each other. Complete graphs of
sufficiently large size are considered as the structured approach of infinite population.
However, it is unlikely that every node interacts with every other node in real, large
interaction networks.
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs are constructed by adding edges between two randomly selected
vertices with probability p, avoiding self-loops. Their degree distribution follows the
Poisson distribution for large network size N , while their average degree can be
calculated as λ = (N − 1)p. For sufficiently large N , it holds that λ ∼ Np.
A rigorous mathematical formulation of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph properties is pre-
sented in [18]. For sufficiently large network size N and p ≤ 1/N , there is no giant
component and the graph consists of small and isolated components. At p = 1/N ,
a giant component appears and its size increases abruptly with increasing p. The
giant component of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs exhibits small diameter for small values of
connection probability p (given by logNlogλ ), while the clustering coefficient is exactly
p provided that the graph is connected.
Random regular graphs
Random regular graphs are graphs with no structural effects and with uniform degree
distribution d, i.e. every graph vertex i has di = d number of neighbours.
For the purpose of this thesis, we construct random regular graphs via the erased
configuration model [80], which is based on the configuration model [12]. According
to the configuration model, every vertex is assigned a number of half-edges equal to
her desired degree and then a uniform random matching between all half-edges is
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performed. For random regular graphs, the desired degree of every vertex is exactly
d. The erased configuration model guarantees that the constructed graph is simple
by removing any self-loops and merging any multiple edges into one.
In general, any random graph with predefined degree sequence (see [12] and [50]
for the necessary conditions satisfied by the degree sequence) can be constructed
via the configuration model. For this reason, random graphs constructed via the
configuration model can be used to approximate real networks for which only their
degree distribution is known [55].
Lattices
Lattices are spatially structured networks where the nodes occupy the vertices of a
square grid and their neighbourhood expands up to a predefined distance: it either
includes the nearest nodes in the four principal directions (degree k = 4 for every
node) or it includes the nearest and the next-nearest nodes as neighbours (degree
k = 8). These structures exhibit short loops that prevent the information from
travelling through the network, but at the same time preserve the communities
shaped by same strategists.
Power-Law graphs
The network structures that we examined so far either had uniform degree distri-
bution or their degree distribution exhibited exponential decay as moved away from
the mean value (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs). However, this is not the case for real world
networks that show a greater variation in degrees along with extreme values.
To capture this network property, preferential attachment was proposed by Albert
and Baraba´si in 1999 [7]. According to this method, we start with a very small
connected network of k vertices and then introduce other vertices to the network
one-by-one. The newly-introduced vertex gets linked to m existing vertices with
probability proportional to their degree. This method gives a power-law degree
distribution with exponent γ = 3.
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For our simulations, we constructed a power-law graph via preferential attachment
starting with a “seed” of k = 3 connected vertices, while every new vertex gets
attached to m = 2 existing vertices. After introducing all the vertices in the network,
a power-law graph with degree distribution exponent γ = 3 and average degree
k¯ = 2m is constructed.
2.5.3 Simulation settings
Simulations of the switching cost game were performed for various network mod-
els and update strategies in an effort to investigate their combined effect on the
evolutionary outcome. To explore this, we needed to build the implementation
in a way that each impact factor could be easily isolated or added. The object-
oriented programming was considered the most suitable for this purpose, because
of its expandability and flexibility. The implementation was therefore built in Java
programming language using the Eclipse SDK platform version 3.6.2 [1], [2].
Simulations were performed over several independent runs, each run starting with
a fresh realisation of the network configuration under study. In every run, the net-
work initialisation took place after its realisation and every node in the network
adopted strategy B with uniform probability x0 ∈ [0, 1]. After the initialisation
of the network, every node played the switching cost game in her neighbourhood
according to synchronous myopic best response until the network reached an equilib-
rium state. Finally, the numerical results of interest were gathered at the equilibrium
state for every run and then averaged out over the total number of independent runs.
2.6 Effects of Game Parameters
Game parameters - payoff q and switching costs cA and cB - have a significant impact
on the game dynamics. As we can see in Equations (2.1) and (2.2), their combination
determines the threshold fraction of neighbours necessary for a strategy change. In
this section, we examine the influence of the game parameters on the evolutionary
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Figure 2.1: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 at random
regular graphs of degree k = 20 for various payoff values q. Switching costs set
to cA = cB = 0.25. For q 6= 0.5, two network equilibria are observed as opposed
to three for q = 0.5: one consensus region and one coexistence region exist and
they both depend on payoff q.
outcome by performing simulations of the switching cost game on random regular
graphs.
2.6.1 Payoff q
At the standard coordination game (Table 2.1), payoff q ∈ [0, 1] represents the
relative quality of the available strategies. In a two-player setting, strategy A consists
a better choice than B if q > 1/2. In a network setting, the combination of payoff q
and costs cA, cB determine the threshold fraction required for a strategy change.
While keeping the switching costs constant and symmetric, we tune payoff q
(Fig.2.1). For payoff q = 0.5 and symmetric costs, we observe three network equilib-
ria - two consensus regions and one coexistence region - at different ranges of initial
condition. This payoff value indicates that the two strategies exert the same amount
of influence on the players. The choice of a ‘neutral’ payoff value and symmetric
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switching costs allow the neighbourhood effects to play the determinant role in the
equilibrium selection.
In Figure 2.1 we can see that a biased choice of payoff q gives different sets of
equilibria. If one strategy is more influential than the other (q 6= 0.5), there is only
one consensus region and the coexistence region, while the minority strategy will
never end up dominating the network.
Contagion Threshold. As we see in Figure 2.1, B-strategy dominates the net-
work at a smaller initial proportion of B-strategists as payoff q becomes smaller.
Therefore, there is a maximum value of payoff q, denoted by qc, for which only one
B-strategist can trigger a large B-cascade. If q > qc, one node can trigger only a
very small, local cascade.
This value is called contagion threshold. The contagion threshold is qc = 1/k for
k-regular random graphs [41], while it is proven that it cannot exceed 1/2 for any
graph [38].
For the switching cost game in k-regular random graphs, we compare both thresh-
olds q + cA and q − cB to 1/k. We assume that up to 10 out of 10000 nodes are
initially activated and we distinguish the following cases:
• If both thresholds q + cA and q − cB are below 1/k, the system converges to
B-equilibrium.
• If only one threshold is below 1/k, (q − cB) < 1/k < (q + cA), the system
converges to A-equilibrium.
• If transitions are allowed in one direction only because of high costs in the
complementary direction of change, the system converges to the relevant equi-
librium.
For the rest of graph structures that we examine here, experiments show that the
contagion threshold is always less than 1/k¯, where k¯ is the average network degree.
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Figure 2.2: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 at random
regular graphs of degree k = 8 for various symmetric costs c. Payoff set to
q = 0.5. The consensus and coexistence regions are observed for some of the
cost values. All lines are symmetrical at (0.5, 0.5), highlighting the symmetry
between the thresholds in the two directions of strategy change.
2.6.2 Switching Costs
Symmetric costs. In this case, strategy changes are penalised by the same cost
value in either direction, cA = cB = c. For instance, assume that two similar but
incompatible Instant Messaging services A and B are used in a technology network.
If a user decides to switch services in order to communicate with more neighbouring
users, she knows that she will be unable to exchange messages with the rest of
the neighbouring nodes. In this case the loss is the same in each direction - the
incompatibility with part of the neighbourhood - and it is described by switching
cost c.
Simulations of the switching cost game on random regular graphs showed the ex-
istence of three network equilibria that appear at different initial conditions: two
consensus regions, where all nodes follow either only strategy A or B and a coexis-
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tence region, where the two strategies happily coexist and they both occupy a finite
fraction of the population (Figure 2.2).
The range of the consensus and coexistence regions depends on the cost value
c. For higher switching cost values, the consensus regions shrink and the coexis-
tence region expands. This happens because there are less configurations that allow
strategy changes in each direction and the nodes are more likely to maintain their
current strategy. For cost c = q = 0.5, there are no configurations that lead to
strategy changes and this is why only a coexistence region is observed where the
initial and the final proportion are the same, xB = x0.
In the context of our technology scenario, the final number of users that prefer IM
service B depends on the initial number of B-users. For small initial numbers, service
B is abandoned and all users prefer service A. As the initial number of B-users grows
larger, there are mixed neighbourhoods of A and B users, until service B dominates
the network. The range of initial condition that lead to mixed neighbourhoods
depends on how important it is for the user to sustain compatibility with the current
subset of his neighbours.
Asymmetric Costs. If asymmetric costs are applied in the switching cost game,
players experience different amount of loss in each strategy change direction, cA 6=
cB.
Consider the IM services A and B as described in the symmetric cost case. Both
services have the same functionality, but B-users are also entitled to discounts in
other services provided by the same technology company. In this case, the switch
from service B to A incurs the loss of some privileges along with the loss of com-
patibility as we have already seen; hence cB > cA.
In the case of asymmetric costs, we observe the same network equilibria as in the
symmetric cost case: two consensus regions and one coexistence region (Figures 2.3
and 2.4).
As cB increases (Fig. 2.3), there are fewer configurations in every neighbourhood
that allow transition from strategy B to A. So as the ratio cA/cB decreases and
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Figure 2.3: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 at random
regular graphs of degree k = 12 for various cost ratios r = cAcB . Payoff set to
q = 0.5 and cA = 0.1. Consensus and coexistence regions are clearly observed,
but their range depends significantly on the cB cost value. The lines are not
symmetrical around (0.5, 0.5) for cA 6= cB .
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Figure 2.4: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 at random
regular graphs of degree k = 12 for various cost ratios r = cAcB . Payoff set to
q = 0.5 and cB = 0.1.
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B-nodes become increasingly reluctant to change, the minority strategy, i.e. B-
strategy, survives at less favourable conditions. This is illustrated by the expanding
coexistence region and the decreasing A-consensus region.
We also observe that B-consensus region slightly increases as the ratio cA/cB
decreases. We would expect that since cost cA and hence the threshold fraction
remains constant, there would be no change in the B−consensus range. However,
this is not the case because, as cB increases, it is more likely that an A−node coexists
with enough B-nodes to switch to B−strategy. Similar reasoning explains Figure
2.4, where the final proportion of B-nodes is presented for various cases of cA > cB.
Switching costs can be so high that they forbid any dynamics from occurring in
the network, as indicated by cost c = 0.5 in Figure 2.2. If we consider high costs
only in one direction, the dynamics evolves only in the direction with the lower
cost. The network equilibria in this case are one consensus and one coexistence
region similar to the ones in Figure 2.1. In that figure, the curve for payoff q = 0
describes the network equilibrium when the dynamics evolves only in the A − B
direction, while the curve for q = 1 describes the final proportion of B-nodes when
the dynamics evolves only in the B −A change direction. Further emphasis on this
type of dynamics is given in Chapter 3.
Considering the general effect of switching costs, we agree with [39] that the
introduction of switching costs turns “ex-ante homogeneous” products into “ex-post
heterogeneous”. Even if we show neutral preferences for the available strategies by
setting payoff q = 0.5, the existence of switching costs is responsible for introducing
a degree of inertia into the users’ behaviour, illustrated by the emergence of a mixed
phase for various initial conditions. Numerical results showed that the absolute and
relative value of costs define the limits of the mixed phase.
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Figure 2.5: Final proportion of B-nodes x∗ as a function of initial condition x(0) in a com-
plete graph for various symmetric costs cA = cB = c and q = 0.5. Three
network equilibria exist for c = 0.25; two consensus and one coexistence re-
gion. Zero costs only lead to consensus, while high costs only to coexistence.
The limits of consensus and coexistence regions are clearly defined and can be
calculated as functions of the payoff q and cost values c.
2.7 Effects of Structure
In this section, we study the effects of network structure on the network equilibrium
state.
2.7.1 Complete graphs
Assume that the switching cost game is applied to a complete graph of sufficiently
large sizeN . For large values ofN and for every player i, it holds that
∑
j∼iXj(t)/di =
x(t), where x(t) is the probability of playing strategy B at time instance t.
From the simulations we observe that the synchronous dynamics converges af-
ter only one time step in complete graphs. The proportion x∗ of B-strategists at
equilibrium as a function of their initial proportion x(0) is shown in Figure 2.5 for
payoff q = 0.5 and symmetric costs c. Depending on the initial condition, the system
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Figure 2.6: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of the initial condition x0 for
random regular graphs of various degrees k and complete graphs. In all net-
works, switching cost game parameters were set to q = 0.5 and cA = cB = 0.25.
The outcome in complete graphs fails to predict the limits of coexistence and
consensus regions for random regular graphs.
converges either to full consensus or to coexistence of strategies. More precisely,
• If x(0) < q − cB, all B-strategists switch to strategy A in the first time step
and so x(t) = 0, t ≥ 1.
• If x(0) > q + cA, all A-strategists switch to strategy B in the first time step
and so x(t) = 1, t ≥ 1.
• If q − cB ≤ x(0) ≤ q + cA, no player changes strategy and so the whole
population remains in the initial state, x(t) = x(0), t ≥ 1.
If we compare the cost-free and the costly version of the switching cost game, we
see that the presence of switching costs is responsible for the emergence of a mixed
phase where both strategies exist in unequal proportions. However, the outcome in
complete graphs failed to predict the outcome in non-complete graphs (Fig. 2.6).
For this reason, we needed to investigate the effects of structure on equilibrium selec-
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tion. We study the equilibrium state of the switching cost game at the prototypical
network structures described in the previous section.
2.7.2 Degree-homogeneous populations
Simulations of the switching cost game at random regular graphs show that the
network degree k also impacts on the network equilibrium, since the node degree
(and so the network degree for regular graphs) is the third factor that contributes
to the threshold fraction (Figure 2.6).
The coexistence region becomes wider as the network degree becomes smaller than
k = 50, covering almost the whole range of initial condition at k = 4. A smaller
degree contributes to fewer configurations that lead to A-to-B and B-to-A strategy
change via Equation (2.1) and (2.2) respectively. This means that the minority
strategists, who support B if x0 < 0.5 and A otherwise, manage to maintain their
state at less favourable conditions, contributing thus to the positive final number of
B-strategists (otherwise A-strategists) in these conditions.
In addition to the wider coexistence region, a smoother transition between differ-
ent regions is observed for small degrees, as opposed to large ones where a sharp
transition occurs. High degrees can prevent the minority strategy from surviving
for various initial conditions up to a threshold value, called critical mass, at which
a tipping in their behaviour is observed.
The network structure of the homogeneous networks presented here has little
impact on the network equilibrium state, despite the existence of cycles in the lattice
structure (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). The effect of cycles on the network equilibrium
becomes clear if we examine the largest cluster of B-nodes as a function of the initial
condition x0 (Figure 2.9). The largest B-cluster starts occupying a finite fraction of
the lattice at a higher initial condition than at the random regular graph of the same
degree, where there are significantly fewer loops. This happens because cycles allow
strategy B to spread only locally and B-strategists form small, isolated clusters for a
larger range of initial conditions in the lattice than in random regular graphs before
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Figure 2.7: Final proportion of B-nodes as a function of the initial condition x0 in random
regular graphs of degree k = 4 and lattices of the same degree with switching
cost game parameters set to q = 0.5 and cA = cB = 0.25. We observe that the
network degree plays a more significant role than the network structure in the
formation of the equilibrium state.
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Figure 2.8: Final proportion of B-nodes as a function of the initial condition x0 in random
regular graphs of degree k = 8 and lattices of the same degree. Switching cost
game parameters same as Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.9: Normalised largest cluster size s1 = S1/N as a function of the initial condition
x0 for the degree-homogeneous populations described in Figures 2.7 and 2.8.
We observe that the largest cluster emerges at larger initial conditions at the
lattice than at random regular graphs due to the existence of cycles in the
lattice structure.
merging into a large cluster that occupies a finite fraction of the population (largest
cluster in Figure 2.9).
2.7.3 Degree-Heterogeneous populations
Simulations of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs of various average degrees k¯ = Np, where p
is the connection probability and N the total number of nodes, showed that the
network equilibrium state depends on the combination of average degree k¯ and the
initial condition x0. Similarly to random regular graphs (Figure 2.6), we observe
that the transitions between the different regimes (A-consensus, B-consensus and
coexistence regions) become sharp for k¯ ≥ 12 for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs (Figure 2.10).
The coexistence region becomes shorter as the degree increases up to k¯ = 20, but for
larger degrees it expands again, as it appears at the phase diagram in Figure 2.11.
In Figure 2.12, we compare the equilibrium state of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs and one
of the two homogeneous networks that we have seen here; the square lattice. We
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Figure 2.10: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 in Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs for various degrees k with switching cost game parameters q =
0.5 and cA = cB = 0.25.
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Figure 2.11: Diagram where the boundaries between the different regimes (A-consensus,
coexistence region and B-consensus) versus initial condition x0 are demon-
strated for various average degrees k¯.
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Figure 2.12: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 in Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs for average degree k = 8 and lattice of the same degree with
switching cost game parameters q = 0.5 and cA = cB = 0.25.
conjecture that the small diameter of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs stops the cascade of B-
strategy in the network for as long as it is minority, while it facilitates it in initial
conditions where B is majority.
In Figure 2.13, we observe the difference in the network equilibrium between
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs and Scale-Free networks of average degree k¯ = 4. In Scale-Free
networks, the degree distribution exhibits a power-law behaviour, as opposed to
the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, where the degree distribution is Poisson. The power-law
distribution leads to the existence of significantly high-degree nodes that stop the
cascade and contribute to the elimination of the minority opinion for more values of
initial condition than the ER graphs.
Synchronicity of updates
Simulations of the switching cost game demonstrated that the synchronicity of the
update rule, i.e. considering synchronous or asynchronous myopic best response,
does not affect the final proportions of strategies.
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Figure 2.13: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 for Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs and Scale-Free networks with switching cost game parameters
q = 0.5, cA = cB = 0.25. In both networks, the average degree is k¯ = 4.
Effects of system size
Simulations of the switching cost game on networks of size N = 1000, N = 5000
and N = 10000 nodes showed that the final proportion of B-strategists depends on
the network structure and it is independent of the population size N .
Conclusively, in this section we have seen that the switching cost effect (coexis-
tence region of A and B strategists) appears independently of the network structure.
Only the limits of this region are affected by the network structure and the initial
proportion of B-strategists.
2.8 Time to convergence
In our simulation setting, every node follows the update rule with probability 1.
Due to the deterministic nature of the dynamics, we expect that the system reaches
a frozen state where no more changes occur at a finite number of steps.
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Figure 2.14: Final proportion of B-nodes xB and number of time steps to convergence E(T )
as a function of initial condition x0 for random regular graphs of degree k = 8.
Switching cost game parameters q = 0.5, cA = cB = 0.25.
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Figure 2.15: Time to convergence E(T) as a function of initial condition x0 for random
regular graphs of various degrees k. Switching cost game parameters q = 0.5,
cA = cB = 0.25.
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Let E(T ) denote the number of steps until equilibrium, also called time to con-
vergence, averaged over the total number of iterations as described in Section 2.5.3.
The time to convergence E(T ) as a function of initial condition x0 and proportion
of B-nodes xB at equilibrium is shown in Figure 2.14.
The maximum number of time steps until equilibrium is observed at the boundary
of consensus and coexistence regions. The time to convergence increases as the limit
of A-consensus region is approached. This happens because higher initial proportion
of B-nodes in the network leads to more B-to-A strategy changes and therefore more
rounds are required to suppress the minority strategy (in this case, strategy B) and
reach A-consensus. In the coexistence region and for x0 < 0.5, the minority opinion
survives and thus the cascade starts to grow, allowing many nodes to maintain
their state. In this subregion, the time to converge to the mixed state equilibrium
decreases as the initial condition tends to 0.5. After strategy B becomes majority,
the time to convergence starts increasing again due to A to B strategy changes and
reaches its maximum at the beginning of the B-consensus region. In the B-consensus
region and as x0 increases, less and less strategy changes are required, so the time to
convergence decreases until the system converges to B-equilibrium at the first time
step (x0 = 1).
The impact of network degree on time to convergence is shown in Figure 2.15.
The time to convergence increases as the network degree increases until a certain
connectivity. After this, the system requires fewer steps to converge. The more
connected the system, the shorter the average distance between nodes; the cascade
thus spreads faster in the network and consequently the network reaches a frozen
state faster. Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show the time to convergence E(T ) as a function of
initial condition x0 for homogeneous and heterogeneous degree networks. For all the
graph structures, the time steps required for equilibrium show the same behaviour
as the initial condition x0 varies in the network. We derive from the figures that the
spatial structure delays convergence to equilibrium state in the coexistence region
compared to random graphs. The diversity in degrees present in scale-free networks
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Figure 2.16: Time to convergence E(T ) for heterogeneous and homogeneous networks of
average degree k = 8.
delays the convergence to equilibrium in the boundaries of coexistence and consensus
regions compared to Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs.
The switching costs also produce an impact on the time to convergence. In Figure
2.18, it is shown that the coexistence region is reached at fewer time steps for higher
costs than for smaller ones. Necessary condition for this is that different costs
contribute to different thresholds for strategy change; this condition is satisfied for
the choice of costs in Figure 2.18 where strategy changes occur if the number of
disagreeing neighbours is larger than nine for c = 0.25 and larger than ten for c = 0.4.
So the threshold is larger for higher costs and therefore the number of configurations
responsible for strategy change is smaller. The system then evolves for fewer rounds
and it freezes faster for higher rather than for smaller costs. This observation is
counter-intuitive because, as mentioned in [59], we would intuitively expect that the
inertia introduced by switching costs would make changes less frequent and hence
slower.
The time to convergence E(T ) also shows a dependence on the network size N , as
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Figure 2.17: Time to convergence E(T ) as a function of initial condition x0 for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graphs (ER) of average degree k¯ = 4 and Scale-Free networks (SF) constructed
with preferential attachment.
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Figure 2.18: Time to convergence E(T ) as a function of initial condition x0 for random
regular graphs of degree k = 12 and two symmetric cost values c = 0.25 and
c = 0.4. Payoff set to q = 0.5.
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Figure 2.19: Time to convergence E(T ) as a function of initial condition x0 for random
regular graphs of degree k = 8 and N number of vertices. Switching cost
game parameters: q = 0.5 and cA = cB = 0.25.
it can be seen in Figure 2.19. A larger number of time steps are required to reach the
equilibrium state in larger networks, but the dependence of E(T ) on initial condition
x0 remains unaffected by the network size N .
2.9 Restriction on transitions
The switching cost game dynamics described so far does not put any limitations on
the node transitions. Every node in the network changes her strategy as determined
by the local rule, regardless of how many times she has already changed her mind.
Let us consider the restriction that only one transition is allowed for every node
in the network; a node can change her strategy only once and then she stays frozen
at this state [67]. This variation of the switching cost game is called 1T -variation
throughout the thesis. Since strategy changes can still occur in both directions, this
variation preserves the non-progressive nature of the switching cost game dynamics.
We need to examine if the restriction of one transition imposes any effects on the
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network equilibrium.
The proportion of B-strategists on k-regular random graphs is the same for the
unlimited transitions and the one-transition cases (Figure 2.20). Consider a node
who has just changed state; this means that the number of B-nodes in his neigh-
bourhood satisfied one of the thresholds described by Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2). In order
to switch back to the previous state, a large number of strategy changes needs to
occur in the neighbourhood. Even though this is rare for initial conditions that lead
to consensus, this is not the case for the ones that lead to coexistence. For these
initial conditions, the dynamics starts with enough B-strategists to maintain versa-
tile neighbourhoods (of both A- and B-strategists) and therefore strategy changes
require less effort than in the consensus regions. Nevertheless, even in this case the
difference between the final proportions is negligible for the two cases, as it can be
seen in Figure 2.21.
The 1T -variation, however, is not as representative if we consider smaller costs or
complex network structures. In Figure 2.22, we consider both small costs and scale-
free networks and the difference in final proportions between one and unlimited
transitions is clear: the restricted case results into smaller consensus regions and
wider coexistence than the unrestricted case.
2.10 Summary
In this chapter, the switching cost game dynamics and the simulation framework
are delineated. Numerical results derived from the simulations showed that the
switching costs are responsible for a mixed equilibrium state where the two strategies
coexist in unequal proportions. The limits of the coexistence region depended on the
absolute and relative values of costs. The network degree and the network structure
in general also produced an effect on the limits of the observed network equilibria.
The contagion threshold of random regular graphs is examined with regard to
the thresholds in every direction of change. The cost values also had an impact on
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Figure 2.22: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 for Scale-
Free networks for dynamics that allows unlimited transitions or only one.
Game parameters q = 0.5, cA = cB = 0.1.
the time to convergence with higher costs leading to faster convergence. Finally,
limiting the number of allowed transitions to only one per node gives the same
qualitative outcome with unlimited transitions in random regular graphs. Only
small but yet negligible differences between the two outcomes are observed in the
coexistence region. However, the restriction on transitions results into non-negligible
differences in the outcome of scale-free networks with the 1T -variation leading to
wider coexistence region than the unlimited transitions case.
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3 Analytical Approach of the
Diffusion Dynamics
3.1 Motivation
In the previous chapter, the numerical study of the switching cost game demon-
strated a clear connection between the initial and final proportions of the available
strategies. For the same dynamics, it was the initial proportion of strategies that
determined their extinction or their survival. More precisely, the numerical results
presented in the previous chapter repeatedly showed that the final proportion of
strategies is a non-decreasing function of their initial proportion and that if a certain
initial proportion is reached, one of the available strategies will become dominant in
the network.
The ability to predict the proportion of strategies at equilibrium given their initial
proportion, as well as the aforementioned critical initial proportion, is a powerful tool
for social dynamics. The aim of this chapter is to explore methods that describe the
time evolution of strategy adoption and therefore can calculate the final proportions
of the competing strategies. Two versions of the underlying dynamics - progressive
and non-progressive - are considered and the final proportions are calculated via a
different analytical method for each version. Numerical and analytical results are
compared for each type of dynamics. The different versions are also compared to
each other; firstly by investigating the relative order between nodes’ states at each
version and secondly by performing simultaneous simulations of the two dynamics
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on the same network settings.
3.2 Chapter Overview
In section 3.3, an overview of analytical methods that calculate the cascade size at
equilibrium is presented. In section 3.4, the progressive versions derived from the
non-progressive version of the switching cost game are introduced and the equations
that describe the state of every node in the network at time t are given for the three
different dynamics. Section 3.5 follows; in this section we present mathematical
and numerical evidence that the non-progressive switching cost game is bounded by
its progressive versions. The final size of the cascade for the progressive models is
calculated in Section 3.6 using relevant literature techniques. A summary of this
chapter is provided in Section 3.7.
3.3 Relevant Literature
In relevant literature, the calculation of the final proportion of strategies in a network
is translated to the cascade size of product diffusion processes. A common property
of these processes is that they allow the dynamics to evolve only in one direction
between the states involved, unlike the switching cost game dynamics that allows
strategy changes to happen in both directions. Interestingly, the uni-directional
dynamics guarantees that the proportion of strategies in the network is monotonous
during its evolution by freezing the nodes that reach a certain state.
The most relevant uni-directional diffusion processes to our threshold model set-
ting are the bootstrap percolation process and the k-core (described later in the
section). In bootstrap percolation, every node becomes active with uniform prob-
ability p at t = 0 and inactive with probability 1 − p. At subsequent steps, every
inactive node becomes active if there are at least θ ≥ 1 active neighbours in her
neighbourhood, while every active node remains active regardless of the number of
inactive neighbours. Even though bootstrap percolation was introduced in [14] in
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1979 to describe magnetic effects on the lattice, its applications have expanded since
then to span areas such as fluid dynamics or computer storage systems [3]. In an
epidemic or opinion dynamics setting, the process becomes equivalent to the contact
process for θ = 1, while it is reminiscent of various opinion models for θ > 1.
Extensive literature exists about bootstrap percolation where several methods
that calculate the cascade size in random graphs are proposed. Balogh and Pit-
tell [6] studied the bootstrap percolation process with activation thresholds θ that
satisfy the condition 2 ≤ θ ≤ k − 1 on k-regular random graphs constructed by
the configuration model. In their study they focused on the identification of the
critical probability value pc, above which the final proportion of active nodes goes
asymptotically to 1. To achieve this, they proposed a Markov Chain that blends the
diffusion dynamics described by bootstrap percolation with the configuration model
and thus the construction of the graph.
According to the configuration model [12], every vertex is assigned a number of
half-edges equal to her desired degree and a random matching is performed on the
set of half-edges, forming thus edges between vertices. Regardless of the construction
of the graph, the dynamics starts with activating a random set of vertices. In the
“slowed down” process proposed by Balogh and Pittel, one active half-edge (that is
a half-edge that belongs to an active vertex) is selected at every time step. After
its partner is identified, both half-edges are removed from the respective vertices. If
the partner belongs to an inactive vertex with already (θ − 1) removed half-edges,
it means that the vertex has at least θ active neighbours and it is time to become
active. This deletion process continues until there are no more half-edges with that
property. Therefore, the Markov Chain states describe the time steps of this deletion
process by counting the number of active and inactive vertices and half-edges at that
time step.
In [4], the deletion process described in [6] is generalised for random graphs with
given degree distribution constructed via the configuration model. Apart from gen-
eralising the results of [6], a formula that calculates the final proportion of active
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nodes below the critical probability pc (above pc the proportion tends to 1 as n→∞)
is derived.
The process just described takes advantage of the monotonicity of the diffusion
illustrated by locking the vertices in the active state. If this restriction is cancelled
as it happens for the switching cost game, active vertices can become inactive if
the local dynamics dictates so. In this case, the deletion process loses its Markov
property since the deletion of two active half-edges leaves active vertices with fewer
active neighbours that may become inactive in the future.
An alternative approximation of the final proportion of active nodes in sparse
random graphs constructed via the configuration model is the Local Mean Field
(LMF) approximation, introduced in [42] and [43] in order to calculate the infec-
tion probability of nodes facing epidemic risks. It is motivated by the mean-field
approximation presented heuristically in [30] and [31], where the number of active
half-edges is calculated without considering any network structure. Contrary to the
mean-field approximation, LMF considers structural effects and provides a local,
tree-like, exploration of the graph via a Galton-Watson branching process [18]. At
every time step, a graph vertex is selected as the tree root and assumed to be in
the inactive state. The probability of the root being active at the next time step is
calculated by calculating recursively the next state of its children.
The main assumption of this process is that the root is always held at the inactive
state so that the activation process of the children is performed “bottom-up” and
not by the root. However, this assumption no longer holds in the switching cost
game dynamics described in Chapter 2, because an inactive root can affect the state
of its active children.
In [8], the probability that a randomly chosen vertex is active at equilibrium is
calculated with the help of the “sub-critical clusters”. These structures consist of
inactive vertices with (θ − 1) active neighbours. Even a single activation occurring
in the neighbourhood of a sub-critical cluster is enough to trigger a number of
subsequent cascades in the cluster or even its complete activation.
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The final proportion of active nodes (or the probability of being active) can be
calculated via the same formulas for all the cases above, provided that the graph
is constructed via the configuration model. The application of these formulas on
random regular graphs will be considered in Section 3.6.
As stated before, a phenomenon similar to our setting as well as the bootstrap
percolation is the emergence of the k-core of a graph; a connected component that
consists of vertices of degree at least k. In case k = 1, the k-core corresponds to the
giant connected component of a network. Even though both bootstrap percolation
and k-core result in the emergence of a graph component that satisfies a threshold
condition, the processes have different nature. Bootstrap percolation is responsible
for vertex activation in a network with few active vertices initially, while at k-core the
whole network is considered and then every vertex with degree less than k is removed
from the network. In [9], a heterogeneous k-core with different thresholds for every
vertex is proposed. If a proportion of vertices is restricted to have threshold equal
to 1 and the rest of the vertices have threshold equal to k, the heterogeneous k-core
emerged can be compared with a bootstrap percolation process where a proportion
of vertices are active at t = 0, while the rest gets activated if the number of active
neighbours exceeds threshold k.
Janson and Luczak introduced an illustrative approach that calculates the k-core
size by making use of empirical distributions of independent random variables [33],
[34]. This approach can also be applied to bootstrap percolation cascade size as
well as the time required to reach that size [41]. According to this method, vertices
are represented by bins and half-edges as balls. The bins are divided into two sets,
active and inactive, while the balls inherit the state of the containing bin. At every
time step one random active ball and one random ball are removed and this process
continues until all active bins are empty. A variation of this is included in [32]
where the explosion of active bins with d balls into d bins with one ball per bin is
considered.
The Balls and Bins approach is modelled as a death process, taking advantage of
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the monotonicity property. This approach cannot describe the switching cost game
dynamics successfully, because the removal of balls from active bins may lead to the
rebirth of active bins into inactive ones.
For the variation of the switching cost game proposed in [67], the diffusion dynam-
ics evolves in both directions with the restriction that every node can change strategy
only once. An analytical calculation of the dynamics evolution of this model is pro-
posed for the Bethe lattice. The main idea behind the calculation takes advantage
of the one-transition property of the model and considers that the switching time
step of a node equals to the switching time step of her θ-th neighbour incremented
by one.
In the rest of this chapter, we will analytically approach the outcome of the
switching cost game with no restrictions on the number of transitions.
3.4 Progressive Dynamics
Assume that two strategies A and B are in competition for survival in a network of
acquaintances. The competition dynamics is described by the switching cost game
defined in Table 2.2.
If transitions between the available strategies are allowed in both directions, i.e.
from strategy A to B and vice versa, the model is called non-progressive. In the non-
progressive case, the number of allowed transitions can be either restricted up to a
number n ≥ 1 of permitted transitions or even unlimited. In this thesis, we consider
the one-transition (n = 1) called 1T -variation in Section 2.9 and the unlimited
transitions cases.
If transitions are allowed in one direction only, the non-progressive model reduces
into two progressive ones, which allow transitions only in the A − B or B − A
direction and are called A−B progressive and B−A progressive respectively. This
means that B-strategists support strategy B forever in the A−B progressive model.
Conversely, A-strategists are forbidden to deviate from strategy A at any step of the
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B −A dynamics evolution.
Assume that variables Xi(t), Yi(t) and Zi(t) represent the state of node i at time
t for the non-progressive, the A − B progressive and the B − A progressive model,
respectively. For any of the aforementioned models, let 0 be the state of node i if
she supports strategy A and 1 otherwise.
If we consider the myopic best-response update rule, the recursive equations (3.1),
(3.2) and (3.3) calculate the state of node i at time t + 1 for the three versions of
the switching cost game. This happens by considering the distribution of strategies
in the neighbourhood as described by the thresholds of Equations (2.1) and (2.2) at
time step t and the state of node i at the same time step. More precisely, for the non-
progressive game (Equation 3.1) the state of node i at time step t+ 1 is determined
by i’s state at time t as well as the number of B-neighbours at that time. However,
for the A − B progressive model (Equation 3.2), the number of B-neighbours does
not contribute in the update of node’s i state in case Yi(t) = 1, highlighting thus the
uni-directional nature of the A− B progressive dynamics. Similarly, for the B − A
progressive model (Equation 3.3), node’s i update does not depend on the number
of B-neighbours if Zi(t) = 0.
Xi(t+ 1) = (1−Xi(t))1(P
j∼i
Xj(t)>(q+cA)di
) +Xi(t)1(P
j∼i
Xj(t)≥(q−cB)di
) (3.1)
Yi(t+ 1) = 1(P
j∼i
Yj(t)>(q+cA)di
) + Yi(t)1(P
j∼i
Yj(t)≤(q+cA)di
) (3.2)
Zi(t+ 1) = Zi(t)1(P
j∼i
Zj(t)≥(q−cB)di
) (3.3)
In all the aforementioned equations, the expression 1{condition} equals 1 if the
condition is satisfied, otherwise it is equal to 0.
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An alternative way to approach the progressive dynamics evolution is by consid-
ering the node’s initial state. Let σi and ζi be two Bernoulli random variables with
parameter α that describe the initial state of node i at the A − B and B − A pro-
gressive model respectively. More precisely, let σi = 0 (respectively ζi = 0) if node i
supports strategy A at time t = 0 of the A− B (B − A) progressive dynamics and
let σi = 1 (ζi = 1) if i supports strategy B. Parameter α is equivalent to the initial
condition x0 appeared in the simulations of Chapter 2.
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) calculate the state of node i at time t of the progressive
dynamics, not recursively as Equations (3.2) and (3.3) do, but as a function of i’s
respective initial state σi and ζi. In these equations, the one-directional dynamics
of the progressive models is obvious: if node i initially supports B in the A − B
model (σi = 1), she supports B forever regardless of the neighbours’ state (Yi(t) = 1
for every t > 0), whereas if node i initially supports A (σi = 0), her state at time t
depends on the number of B-neighbours as described by Equation (3.4).
Similarly, if node i initially supports A in the B−A model (ζi = 0), she supports A
forever regardless of the neighbourhood’s state (Zi(t) = 0 for every t > 0), whereas
if i initially supports B (ζi = 1) her state depends on the number of B-neighbours
as described by Equation (3.5).
Yi(t) = 1− (1− σi)1
∑
j∼i
Yj(t) ≤ (q + cA)di
. (3.4)
Zi(t) = ζi1
∑
j∼i
Zj(t) ≥ (q − cB)di
. (3.5)
We use these equations to calculate the final proportion of B-strategists at the
progressive models over random regular graphs in the following sections.
61
3.5 Coupling
In Section 3.4, the two unidirectional dynamics can be combined or “coupled” to
describe the bidirectional dynamics of the non-progressive model. In this section,
we are interested in examining how the coupling of the two progressive models can
be related to the outcome of the non-progressive model.
3.5.1 Non-progressive model bounds
We examine the relation that links Xi(t), Yi(t) and Zi(t) at every time t > 0.
Theorem 3.1. If every node i in the network has the same initial condition in the
non-progressive and the progressive models,
Zi(0) = Xi(0) = Yi(0), (3.6)
the state of node i in the non-progressive model is bounded by her state at the A−B
and the B −A progressive model at every time t > 0 with the following expression:
Zi(t) ≤ Xi(t) ≤ Yi(t). (3.7)
Proof. To prove this argument, we split the expression (3.7) into two parts and prove
the existence of each bound separately.
Lower bound. We will prove by mathematical induction that the expression
Zi(t) ≤ Xi(t) holds for all t > 0.
• Base step: Based on the assumption Zi(0) = Xi(0) and equations (3.1) and
(3.3), it is easily derived that at t = 1 the expression Zi(1) ≤ Xi(1) holds.
• Inductive hypothesis: Assume that there is a time instance t > 0 at which
Zi(t) ≤ Xi(t). (3.8)
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• Inductive step: We need to prove that Zi(t + 1) ≤ Xi(t+ 1) where t is
the time instance of expression (3.8). Based on this expression, the possible
combinations of (Zi(t), Xi(t)) are the following: (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). We
examine each combination separately.
– Zi(t) = 0, Xi(t) = 0: According to the B − A progressive model, an
A-strategist supports strategy A forever so:
Zi(t+ 1) = Zi(t) = 0 (3.9)
and thus we get that Zi(t+ 1) ≤ Xi(t+ 1).
– Zi(t) = 0, Xi(t) = 1: By following similar reasoning with the previous
combination of (Z,X), we get that Zi(t + 1) ≤ Xi(t+ 1) in this case as
well.
– Zi(t) = 1, Xi(t) = 1: Based on Equations (3.1) and (3.3), we get:
Xi(t+ 1) = 1(P
j∼i
Xj(t)≥(q−c1)di
) (3.10)
Zi(t+ 1) = 1(P
j∼i
Zj(t)≥(q−c1)di
) (3.11)
The assumption about node i in Expression (3.8) is also true for every
neighbour of i:
Zi(t) ≤ Xi(t)⇒
∑
j∼i
Zj(t) ≤
∑
j∼i
Xj(t) (3.12)
Based on (3.12), the expression:
1(P
j∼i
Zj(t)≥(q−c1)di
) ≤ 1(P
j∼i
Xj(t)≥(q−c1)di
) (3.13)
is true for every case of relative order among
∑
j∼i
Zj(t),
∑
j∼i
Xj(t) and
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(q − c1)di. The combination of (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) leads to the
expression Zi(t+ 1) ≤ Xi(t+ 1).
We have just proved that the expression Zi(t + 1) ≤ Xi(t+ 1) is true for all
possible combinations of (Z,X).
Since both the basis and the inductive step have been proved, it has now been proved
by mathematical induction that Zi(t) ≤ Xi(t) holds for all t > 0.
Upper Bound. We will prove by mathematical induction that the expression
Xi(t) ≤ Yi(t) holds for all t > 0.
• Base step: Based on the assumption Xi(0) = Yi(0) and equations (3.1) and
(3.2), it is easily derived that at t = 1 the expression Xi(1) ≤ Yi(1) holds.
• Inductive hypothesis: Assume that there is a time instance t > 0 at which
Xi(t) ≤ Yi(t). (3.14)
• Inductive step: We need to prove that Xi(t+ 1) ≤ Yi(t+ 1), where t is the
time instance at expression (3.14). Based on the same expression, the possible
combinations of (Xi(t), Yi(t)) are the following: (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). We
will examine each combination separately.
– Xi(t) = 0, Yi(t) = 0: Based on Eqs.(3.1) and (3.2) we get
Xi(t+ 1) = 1{Pj∼iXj(t)>(q+c0)di} (3.15)
Yi(t+ 1) = 1{Pj∼i Yj(t)>(q+c0)di} (3.16)
By following similar reasoning with expressions (3.12) and (3.13) and
based on expression (3.14), we conclude that Xi(t+ 1) ≤ Yi(t+ 1).
– Xi(t) = 0, Yi(t) = 1: In this case, we take advantage of the nature of the
A−B progressive model; a node that supports B either after some time
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or from the beginning, she will support strategy B forever:
Yi(t+ 1) = Yi(t) = 1 (3.17)
and thus we get that Xi(t+ 1) ≤ Yi(t+ 1).
– Xi(t) = 1, Yi(t) = 1: By following similar reasoning with the previous
combination of (X,Y ), we get that Xi(t + 1) ≤ Yi(t+ 1) in this case as
well.
We have just proved that the expression Xi(t + 1) ≤ Yi(t+ 1) is true for all
possible combinations of (Z,X).
Since both the basis and the inductive step have been proved, it has now been proved
by mathematical induction that Xi(t) ≤ Yi(t) holds for all t > 0.
We have proved that both parts of the expression (3.7) hold at any time step t > 0
of the dynamics.
3.5.2 Coupled simulation
Expression (3.7) shows that the state of a node in the non-progressive model is
bounded between her states in the progressive versions at every time step t. Intu-
itively this means that if a node supports strategy A in the A−B progressive model
(Yi(t) = 0), she also supports strategy A in the other two models (Zi(t) = Xi(t) = 0).
Similarly, if a node supports strategy B in the B−A progressive model (Zi(t) = 1),
she also supports strategy B in the other two models (Xi(t) = Yi(t) = 1).
In this subsection, we show via simulations that the final number of B-strategists
for every type of dynamics follows the same relation with Expression (3.7). But
more importantly, we investigate the effect of switching costs and network structure
on the difference in the final number of B-strategists between the considered types
of dynamics. To illustrate this, we performed a coupled simulation of the three
dynamics, i.e. the non-progressive, the A−B progressive and the B−A progressive
models, applied to the same network with identical initial conditions for the three
65
versions. At every time step, all nodes follow each version of dynamics independently
of the other two and update their relevant strategy according to Equations (3.1),
(3.2) and (3.3).
Motivated by the coupled process introduced in [26], the state of any node i at
time t is defined by the triple < Xi, Yi, Zi > in our coupled simulation. The following
assumptions, consistent to the coupled process introduced in [26], are made:
1. The only available strategies are A and B for all models. At every time step
and for any node state < Xi, Yi, Zi >, it holds that Xi ∈ {A,B}, Yi ∈ {A,B}
and Zi ∈ {A,B}.
2. Every component of the triple represents the state of i at the respective model;
Xi is the state of i at the non-progressive model, while Yi and Zi represent the
state of i in the A−B and B −A progressive models respectively.
3. At every time step and for any node state triple < Xi, Yi, Zi >, Xi = 1 implies
that Yi = 1 (but not vice versa) and Xi = 0 implies that Zi = 0 (but not vice
versa). This is verified by expression (3.7).
Simulations of the coupled process on random regular graphs and other networks
showed that the non-progressive model is perfectly bounded between the progressive
versions (Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3). The final number of B nodes in the A−B progressive
model forms the upper bound, while the one in the B−A progressive model forms the
lower bound. Unlike the non-progressive model, the unidirectional dynamics of the
progressive models allows the respective strategists to survive until equilibrium even
in unfavourable initial network settings, generalising thus the bounds at expression
(3.7) to hold for the total number of B-nodes at equilibrium.
The numerical results of the coupled process showed that two network equilibria
are observed for the progressive games: one consensus and one coexistence region.
The consensus regions are observed at different initial conditions for the two pro-
gressive games; the consensus region of the A − B model coincides with part of
the coexistence region of the B − A model. Similarly, the B − A consensus region
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occurs at a range of initial conditions where A − B coexistence is observed. The
non-progressive model combines the two progressive dynamics and therefore one
coexistence and two consensus regions are observed, bounded by the progressive
equilibria for all initial conditions.
The distance between the upper and the lower bound, which is described by
the difference in the final proportion of B-nodes xB between the bounds for the
same initial condition x0, along with the distance between each bound and the non-
progressive equilibrium, which is described by the difference in the final proportion
of B-nodes xB between each bound and the non-progressive game for the same ini-
tial condition x0, can be used as a measure of the progressive dynamics coupling to
the non-progressive outcome. In Figure 3.1, we observe the effect of the network
degree on the progressive outcomes and, by extension, on the coupling. The dis-
tance between the bounds is larger in case one of the progressive dynamics reaches
consensus compared to the distance in case both games result to coexistence. This
difference is accentuated as the network degree increases because the consensus re-
gion of each progressive game increases while the coexistence region decreases for
increasing network degree.
The non-progressive model follows the consensus regions of both progressive mod-
els. A difference between the non-progressive and the progressive outcomes in the
coexistence region is observed for small degrees that becomes negligible for large
degrees. From all the above, we can conclude that the non-progressive outcome
at random regular graphs can be described - with higher precision as the network
degree increases - by the B−A progressive model for initial conditions x0 < 0.5 and
the A−B model for larger values of initial condition.
As seen in Section 2.7, the random regular graphs produce no structural effects
on the game dynamics. To examine how the network structure affects the coupling,
we need to consider various networks (Figure 3.2). Even though the boundary
conditions are satisfied for all networks studied, every network shows a different
degree of coupling. The coupling of the progressive dynamics is lower in spatially
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Figure 3.3: Final proportion of B-nodes xB as a function of initial condition x0 for our cou-
pled simulation in scale-free networks for symmetric cost values cA = cB = 0.25
(top) and cA = cB = 0.1 (bottom). Payoff set to q = 0.5. The distance between
the progressive games and the non-progressive game increases for smaller cost
values.
structured networks, as in the case where nodes are connected on a line (top left in
Figure 3.2), than in networks with no structure, such as the random regular graphs
(top right in the same figure). For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs (bottom left in Figure 3.2),
the difference in final proportions between the bounds and between each bound
and the non-progressive outcome lies between the respective difference in spatial
and unstructured networks; possibly due to small graph diameter. Finally, the
existence of large degree nodes in scale-free networks (bottom right in Figure 3.2) is
responsible for the difference in the final proportions of strategies in the progressive
games when one of them reaches consensus. For every value of initial condition,
the non-progressive outcome in scale-free networks is closer to the progressive game
that favours the majority strategy. At x0 = 0.5, where both strategies appear in
equal proportions, the non-progressive outcome is xB = 0.5 for the studied network
structures.
70
The impact of costs on the network equilibrium is examined in Section 2.6.2. We
expect that the cost value also affects the progressive outcomes and, by extension,
their coupling. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3, where a smaller value of symmetric
costs produces significant differences in the distance between the bounds and their
distance from the non-progressive outcome in scale-free networks. The number of
possible configurations that lead to strategy changes is larger for smaller cost values
and this fact, in combination with the presence of large degree nodes that either
restrain or facilitate the cascade to a significant extent, is responsible for the smaller
level of coupling as the cost value of symmetric costs becomes smaller.
Conclusively, we showed by induction and simulations that the two progressive
models bound the non-progressive model for various network models, network de-
grees and cost values.
3.6 Analytical calculation of the non-progressive model
bounds
Motivated by bootstrap percolation where every inactive vertex becomes active if
the number of her active neighbours is at least θ, we draw an analogy between
A- and B-strategists and inactive and active vertices respectively. Therefore, the
A − B progressive dynamics can be modelled as a bootstrap percolation process
with activation threshold for every vertex θAB = (q + cA)k. The B −A progressive
dynamics dictates that active vertices become inactive if the number of inactive
neighbours exceeds threshold θBA = k − (q − cB)k and it is also reminiscent of
bootstrap percolation. In both dynamics, k represents the vertex degree and payoff
q and switching costs cA, cB are the switching cost game parameters as defined in
Table 2.2.
The analytical methods described in Section 3.3 calculate the final number of
vertices (nodes) activated by a bootstrap percolation process. In this section, we
calculate the progressive bounds in random regular graphs by using these techniques.
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3.6.1 Upper bound calculation
To calculate the upper bound of the non-progressive model, we need to calculate
the final proportion of B-nodes in the A − B progressive model. In other words,
we need to calculate the final proportion of active nodes triggered by a bootstrap
percolation process with activation threshold θAB = (q + cA)k. For this purpose,
we consider the LMF approximation described in [41], according to which a sparse
random graph is explored via a local tree-like branching process where the root is
always held at the inactive state.
We consider the following equations derived from the LMF approximation:
h(z) = (1− α)kzP(Bin(k − 1, 1− z) ≤ θAB − 1) (3.18)
and
h1(z) = P(Bin(k, 1− z) ≤ θAB − 1), (3.19)
where z the probability of an inactive node, α the uniform activation probability (at
time t = 0), k the network degree of the random regular graph and θAB = (q+ cA)k
the activation threshold for every node.
Expression P(Bin(k − 1, 1 − z) ≤ θAB − 1) describes the probability of encoun-
tering fewer than θAB active nodes out of (k − 1) available nodes1 in every node’s
neighbourhood except for the root’s neighbourhood. The probability of encounter-
ing fewer than θAB active nodes in the root’s neighbourhood is given by expression
P(Bin(k, 1− z) ≤ θAB − 1) where the state of k nodes is examined.
Let Φ(α) be the final proportion of active nodes if every node is initially activated
with probability α. If α > αc, where
αc = 1− inf
0<z≤1
z
P(Bin(k − 1, 1− z) ≤ θAB − 1) (3.20)
1Since the root is always inactive, she is not taken into consideration when looking for active
nodes.
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Figure 3.4: Analytical calculation of the final proportion of B-nodes Φ(α) as a function
of activation probability α for random regular graphs of degree k. Asterisks
correspond to numerical results of the A − B progressive model simulations
with switching cost game parameters q = 0.5 and cA = 0.25.
the cascade of strategy B reaches asymptotically all nodes and the final proportion of
B-nodes approaches Φ(α) = 1. Otherwise for α < αc, the proportion of B-strategists
at equilibrium is calculated via Equation (3.21):
Φ(α) = 1− (1− α)h1(zˆ), (3.21)
where zˆ ∈ [0, 1] is the largest root zˆ of Equation (3.22):
kz2 = h(z). (3.22)
Following the aforementioned set of equations, we calculated proportion Φ(α)
for various network degrees k (Figure 3.4). In the same figure it is clear that the
critical probability αc, also called critical mass, depends on the network degree
k. Interestingly, as the network degree increases, αc becomes smaller, while the
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transition to complete activation becomes sharper.
To understand the shape of the curves for different degrees k in Figure 3.4, we
need to consider Equation (3.22). There is no local minimum point for this function
in case θAB = k − 1, while for θAB < k − 1 there is only one local minimum point.
If switching cost game parameters are set to q = 0.5 and cA = cB = 0.25, as for
the results in Figure 3.4, then threshold θAB is calculated to be θAB = k − 1 for
4-regular graphs and θAB < k − 1 for all the other degrees examined. As observed,
the analytical results in random regular graphs are verified by the numerical results
of the coupled simulation in the same networks.
3.6.2 Lower bound calculation
The lower bound corresponds to the final proportion of B-nodes at the B − A
progressive model. In analogy with the upper bound, we need to calculate the
proportion of active nodes at equilibrium of a reverse bootstrap percolation process
with deactivation threshold θBA = k − (q − cB)k.
Consider variable Z˜i complementary to variable Zi that describes the state of node
i at the B −A progressive model. Because the two variables are complementary, it
holds that Z˜i = 1−Zi and therefore Z˜i = 1 if i supports A and Z˜i = 0 if i supports
B. Additionally consider ζ˜i = 1− ζi with parameter α˜ = 1− α as the variable that
describes the initial state of node i; ζ˜i = 1 if i supports A at t = 0 and ζ˜i = 0
otherwise. After these considerations, we can argue that the outcome of the B −A
progressive model with variables Z˜i and ζ˜i and parameter α˜ can be calculated by
the same formulas as the A−B outcome. However, instead of calculating the final
proportion of active nodes as we did for the A−B model, here we calculate the final
proportion of inactive nodes.
Similar to the upper-bound calculation, we consider the following equations de-
rived from the LMF approximation:
h(z) = (1− α˜)kzP(Bin(k − 1, 1− z) ≤ θBA − 1) (3.23)
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and
h1(z) = P(Bin(k, 1− z) ≤ θBA − 1), (3.24)
where z the probability of an active node, α˜ the probability of a node initialised
as inactive at time t = 0, k the network degree of the random regular graph and
θBA = k − (q + cB)k the de-activation threshold for every node.
Expression P(Bin(k − 1, 1 − z) ≤ θBA − 1) describes the probability of encoun-
tering fewer than θBA inactive nodes out of (k − 1) available nodes in every node’s
neighbourhood except for the root’s neighbourhood. The probability of encounter-
ing fewer than θBA inactive nodes in the root’s neighbourhood is given by expression
P(Bin(k, 1− z) ≤ θBA − 1) where the state of k nodes is examined.
Let Ψ(α˜) and Φ(α˜) = 1 − Ψ(α˜) be the final proportion of inactive and active
nodes respectively if every node is initially inactive with probability α˜. Continuing
the analogy with the upper bound calculation formulas, we have that if α˜ > α˜c
where
α˜c = 1− inf
0<z≤1
z
P(Bin(k − 1, 1− z) ≤ θBA − 1) , (3.25)
the network is dominated by inactive nodes and therefore the final proportion of
strategies approaches Ψ(α˜) = 1 and Φ(α˜) = 0. If α˜ < α˜c, the final proportion of
inactive nodes is given by the equation
Ψ(α˜) = 1− (1− α˜)h1(zˆ), (3.26)
where zˆ ∈ [0, 1] is the largest root zˆ of Equation (3.22).
If we plot Ψ(α˜) as a function of probability α˜ we get a plot similar to the one
in Figure 3.4. Since α = 1 − α˜, we can calculate the final proportion of active
nodes Φ(α) and plot it as a function of activation probability α for random regular
graphs of various degree k (Figure 3.5). Similar to the upper bound calculation, the
analytical calculation of the lower bound in k-regular graphs is in good agreement
with the numerical results of the coupled simulation.
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Figure 3.5: Analytical calculation of the final proportion of B-nodes Φ(α) as a function
of activation probability α for random regular graphs of degree k. Asterisks
correspond to numerical results of the B − A progressive model simulations
with switching cost game parameters q = 0.5 and cB = 0.25.
In the B−A progressive model, critical probability αc corresponds to the critical
mass above which the active nodes occupy a finite fraction of the network at equi-
librium. This is different than the A−B model where critical mass αc is related to
the complete activation of the network. As we observe in Figure 3.5, critical mass
αc becomes larger for increasing network degree, while the transition from complete
deactivation to partial activation becomes sharper. Similar explanation with the
one in the upper calculation explains the shape of curves in Figure 3.5.
Similar to the boundaries observed in the coupled simulation, the non-progressive
outcome is bounded on both sides by the analytical calculations of the progressive
outcomes for k-regular random graphs (Figure 3.6).
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the progressive type of dynamics and we showed that
the non-progressive switching cost game is a coupling of two progressive dynamics
reminiscent of bootstrap percolation.
We proved by mathematical induction that the state of a node in the non-
progressive model is bounded by her state in the progressive models at any time t,
provided that the node’s initial condition is the same for the three models. Numerical
results derived by the coupled simulation showed that the same boundary conditions
also hold for the equilibrium outcomes of the progressive and non-progressive models.
In the cases examined, the level of interference or coupling between the progressive
processes depended on the network structure and the switching costs and it affected
the distance between the bounds and the non-progressive outcome.
The LMF approximation described in Section 3.3 was used to calculate both upper
and lower bounds at random regular graphs of various degrees by calculating the
final proportions of both active and inactive nodes triggered by bootstrap percolation
processes. The critical initial condition at which one of the available strategies
dominates the network, also called critical mass, was also calculated by the LMF
approximation.
78
4 Switching Costs and Percolation
4.1 Motivation
In the previous chapters, we highlighted the importance of the initial network state
to the determination of the equilibrium state. Each node in the network is activated
uniformly at random with some probability p and if this probability value reaches a
threshold pc - different for every network model used so far - a tipping in the nodes’
behaviour is observed.
The choice of uniform initial activation comes along with a number of advantages
when investigating the impact of network structure on the evolutionary outcome or
when applying analytical methods to predict the final proportions of strategies in
the network. However, the initial condition of strategic behaviour models can be
more complicated and can exhibit spatial variation. A few examples include the
distribution of voters’ for a party, the access to social resources such as education
and healthcare or the design of marketing strategies between urban and rural areas.
In this chapter, we consider a different type of activation, called gradient activa-
tion. According to gradient activation, the activation probability is a function of
every node’s location in the network. A significant advantage over uniform activa-
tion is that gradient activation can simplify the analysis of percolation properties
because of the formation of a borderline between the largest clusters of strategists.
While considering gradient activation, an investigation of the switching cost model
behaviour on the square lattice allows us to identify any percolation transitions that
the system undergoes on the two-dimensional space. To the best of our knowledge,
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this is the first time that a strategic behaviour model is studied on a gradient.
4.2 Chapter Overview
In Section 4.3, existing literature relevant to opinion models exhibiting percolation
phenomena is presented. Additionally, an overview of the main concepts around
gradient percolation is given in the same section. In Section 4.4, the phase transitions
of the switching cost game are investigated in the square lattice, considering either
symmetric or asymmetric costs. Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented in
Section 4.5.
4.3 Relevant Literature
The relevant literature presented here is divided into two branches. In the first
subsection, several opinion models are presented along with their universality class
in two dimensions. In the second subsection, gradient percolation and the main
properties of a system in a gradient are introduced.
4.3.1 Opinion formation and percolation
During the evolution of strategic behaviour models, such as opinion models, stable
clusters of same strategists are formed. These clusters are small and isolated for
small initial proportion of the newly-introduced opinion. However, when the initial
condition reaches a critical value or ‘critical mass’, the clusters merge and a large
cluster of a size proportional to the total number of strategists (called spanning clus-
ter throughout the chapter) is formed. This observation is reminiscent of percolation
and it is thus expected that opinion models exhibit percolation phenomena in the
process of opinion formation.
In opinion dynamics, the majority-voter model, introduced in [44], has been the
subject of extensive research in phase transitions. Every node follows the majority
in her neighbourhood with some probability q, otherwise she follows the minority
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with probablity 1−q. If both opinions are equally represented in the neighbourhood,
the focal node follows one of the two opinions with probability 1/2. Monte-Carlo
simulations of the majority-voter model on the square lattice show that the model
belongs to the two-dimensional Ising model universality class [15],[48],[62],[69].
The majority-voter model dynamics, as described above, eventually leads to con-
sensus and no coexistence of states is allowed. A variation of the majority-voter
model that allows coexistence of opinions is introduced in [74], where a node is al-
lowed to change state if the majority of her neighbourhood - including the focal
node’s opinion - supports the opposite. There has been a recent discussion whether
the transitions observed belong to the invasion or standard percolation class [71],[75].
Nonetheless the effort to translate the clustering behaviour of the model into a per-
colation phenomenon is prevalent in both arguments.
Dependent percolation models based on the Glauber dynamics of the Ising model
were studied in the form of cellular automata applied on the triangular and hexag-
onal lattice [77]. Starting from an initial implementation of standard percolation
in the lattice, the local dynamics of the aforementioned models suggests that the
nodes’ state remains unchanged if there are more than two neighbours of the same
state. This is strongly reminiscent of our synchronous, local dynamics setting and
interestingly the results demonstrated that the dependent percolation models belong
to the same universality class as the independent, standard percolation.
Phase transitions are also observed when opinion models are applied to various
network models, including the small-world and scale-free networks, but their study
is outside the focus of this chapter, where we are mostly interested in the phase
transitions observed on regular lattices.
4.3.2 Gradient Percolation
In standard percolation, a site becomes occupied with uniform probability p and a
phase transition is observed at pc = 0.592746 for the two-dimensional square lattice
[78]. However, there are applications where the occupation probability p exhibits
81
Figure 4.1: Standard site percolation on a square lattice with gradient on the y-axis. The
blue squares represent the empty sites in the system, while the red, black and
pink correspond to the occupied sites of the spanning cluster, the occupied sites
that belong to the percolation hull and the occupied sites that exist in isolated
clusters respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Part of the lattice in Figure 4.1 where we can see the different types of sites in
a gradient environment.
some variation among the sites of a lattice.
Gradient percolation was introduced to describe the case of spatial variation in
p. In this case, a site becomes occupied with a probability p that depends on the
site’s location on the lattice and it can vary either along one coordinate axis or along
both [21]. Any spatial variation in p gives an easily identifiable appearance to the
lattice; any system in a gradient looks qualitatively similar to Figure 4.1. In this
figure, the density of occupied sites increases with increasing y. The occupied sites
at higher densities are connected to occupied sites at lower densities via nearest
neighbour connections, forming a spanning cluster. The boundary of this spanning
cluster that is in contact with the vacant spanning cluster, has a fractal nature and
it is called percolation hull [81].
There is an interesting geographic analogy that describes the different sets of
sites encountered in gradient percolation [25]. The spanning cluster of occupied
sites corresponds to the land and its boundary with the coast. The sea, in contact
with the coast, is the vacant spanning cluster. There are islands (isolated occupied
clusters) in the sea, as well as lakes in the land (isolated empty clusters). In Figure
4.2, we can see the red squares that represent the land, the coast in black and the
islands in pink. The lakes are formed by the blue squares engulfed by the red ones
in the figure.
The properties of the coast are the main focus of gradient percolation. The oc-
cupied sites that belong to the percolation hull extend over a range of probabilities,
as it is obvious in Figure 4.1. The density of occupied sites in the percolation hull
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follows a Gaussian distribution with the distribution mean corresponding to the
percolation threshold pc = 0.592746 [68]. The standard deviation of the hull coordi-
nates is defined as hull width w and it is known to follow a power-law relationship
with gradient g, namely w ∝ g−aσ , with exponent
aσ =
ν
ν + 1
= 4/7, (4.1)
where ν = 4/3 the correlation length exponent in standard percolation [70].
The percolation hull is identified via a self-avoiding random walk [85], performed
on the direction perpendicular to the gradient. The walk starts at an occupied
site with the lowest relevant coordinate that belongs to the spanning cluster and it
continues to its neighbours trying to stay as close to the border as possible. The
algorithm terminates when the other end of the lattice is reached. The number of
steps that a random walker has to walk on the lattice to identify the hull is called
hull length l and it scales as l ∝ g−aN with
aN =
ν
ν + 1
(Df − 1) = 3/7, (4.2)
where Df = 1.76 the fractal dimension of the hull. In standard percolation, the
fraction of the two exponents aσ and aN equals to the correlation length exponent
ν = 4/3. A rigorous mathematical formulation and proof of the exponents aσ and
aN in gradient percolation for triangular lattices is obtained in [56] and [57], where
the values aσ = 4/7 and aN = 3/7 are confirmed.
The applications of gradient percolation span from the description of diffusion
fronts at electromagnetic fields [25], [70] to ecological and biological phenomena
related to population dynamics [22], [23] and urban growth patterns [46], [47]. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that an opinion model is
studied in a gradient.
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4.4 Switching cost model in a gradient
In this thesis, we consider that A and B strategies are in competition for survival
with their competition dynamics described by the switching cost game (Table 2.2).
The holders of these competitive strategies or opinions are regarded as inactive or
active graph vertices in Chapter 3. In this chapter, by drawing an analogy with
statistical physics, active and inactive nodes correspond to occupied and empty
sites respectively.
For our simulations we consider constant gradient g > 0 at the y-direction, so
that the probability p(y) depends linearly on the node’s y-coordinate:
p(y) = pc + g ∗ (y − yc), (4.3)
where pc is the percolation threshold of the switching cost model.
Every node is activated with probability p(y) at the start of the dynamics (at
t = 0). After the initial configuration with the gradient, the local dynamics, as
described by the non-progressive switching cost model, starts. At every time step,
all nodes update their strategy according to synchronous myopic best response with
probability 1. Due to the deterministic nature of the model, the dynamics converges
after a few steps even though the nodes are allowed to alternate between strategies.
At equilibrium, stable clusters of nodes that share the same opinion are formed.
The size and shape of these clusters can vary; however, there is a smallest cluster
structure that can survive for every payoff-cost combination of the switching cost
model. Here we use the Hoshen-Kopelman algorithm [29] to identify the various
clusters and count their respective sizes. The Hoshen-Kopelman algorithm is an
efficient labelling technique that assigns a label to every active node. If this node
has no active neighbours, then an unused label is assigned to the node indicating
that a cluster of unity size is identified. If the node has one active neighbour, the
label already used by the active neighbour is assigned to the node. If there are more
than one active neighbours, the label with the lowest identity number is used while
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the other one becomes outdated. In the case of active neighbours, the size of the
cluster attached to the label is appropriately incremented. With this technique, the
number of clusters and their sizes are efficiently calculated with only one scan of the
lattice.
The percolation hull is identified via the self-avoiding random walk initially de-
scribed in [85]. The algorithm is modified for the case of gradient at the y-direction
and it is performed on active nodes of the largest active cluster. It can be interpreted
as the path with the lowest y-coordinates connecting the leftmost and rightmost part
of the lattice (see Figure 4.1). The algorithm starts at x = 0 and looks for the low-
est y-coordinate where the largest active cluster appears. This is the first position
of the random walker. To find the next position of the walker, we look for active
neighbours in precisely the following order: down, right, up and left. The algorithm
continues until the lowest y-coordinate of the active cluster is reached at x = Lx.
Another way to identify the hull is by identifying the active nodes that are con-
nected to inactive ones on a nearest-neighbour basis and they are both members of
their respective largest clusters. However, this would require to examine the largest
active cluster in its entirety and for this reason it was not preferred.
For all the steps described above, periodic boundary conditions exist at the x-
direction, i.e. the direction that is perpendicular to the gradient axis.
Exhaustive simulations of the methodology described above were performed for
the square lattice at various gradients g and lattice sizes Lx×Ly. Unlike the program-
ming requirements for flexible and expandable code for the simulations of Chapter
2, the main requirements for this chapter’s simulations are execution speed for large
system sizes along with efficient memory usage. To satisfy these requirements, C
programming language was used to build the implementation.
In this implementation, various payoff-cost combinations were tried out in an effort
to explore the effect of the nodes’ interaction on the percolation hull properties.
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4.4.1 Symmetric switching costs
Consider the switching cost game (Table 2.2) with payoff q = 0.5 and symmetric
switching costs cA = cB = c. In addition, consider the thresholds (2.1) and (2.2)
that give the required number of active neighbours for a strategy change. Therefore
the required number of opposite (or disagreeing) neighbours equals to or exceeds the
majority of neighbours in all the payoff-cost combinations presented in this section.
For payoff q = 0.5 and cost c = {0, 0.25, 0.6} at each strategy change direction,
we get three different types of dynamics:
• c = 0: the focal node follows the opinion of the majority in the neighbourhood,
as in the majority voter model [44]. However, here we assume that if both
opinions are equally represented in the neighbourhood, the node maintains
her opinion. We call this variation of the majority voter model as MVM
throughout the chapter.
• c = 0.25: the focal node switches to the opposite opinion if it is followed by
everyone in the neighbourhood. This process is reminiscent of the unanimity
rule described in [40]; for this reason we call this process UR throughout the
chapter.
• c = 0.6: the focal node never changes state; its final state is identical to the
initial condition. The high cost value guarantees no dynamics in the lattice,
reminiscent of standard site percolation [78]. We call this case STP throughout
the chapter.
For each process described above, we ran several batches of simulations on vari-
ous gradients and lattice sizes. We then compare the hull properties in the three
processes with the relevant literature values.
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Figure 4.3: Variation of p(y¯) where y¯ the mean value of the hull y-coordinates distribution
as a function of the gradient g for the three processes under study: STP, UR
and MVM. The asterisks correspond to the critical probability pc, defined as
the limit of p(y¯) as g → 0. The error bars represent the standard deviations
obtained on 12000 samples.
Hull properties
The hull coordinates are known to follow a Gaussian distribution with the distribu-
tion mean connected to pc and the standard deviation of the distribution defined as
hull width w. If we denote the mean of the distribution of the hull’s y-coordinates
by y¯, then p(y¯) approaches the critical probability pc of the system for increasingly
smaller gradients. In Figure 4.3, we observe that the average position of the hull
y¯ depends on the gradient g and the underlying dynamics. As expected, the STP
process on the square lattice has the same critical probability as standard percola-
tion on 2D lattices, pc = 0.592746 [78]. The MVM process on the square lattice was
calculated at pc = 0.506425 using finite-size scaling techniques [71] and this result
is also verified by our system in a gradient study.
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For the UR process, p(y¯) approaches value pc = 0.549 for increasingly smaller gra-
dients. This value lies between the critical probabilities of STP and MVM processes
and it highlights that, apart from the gradient, the underlying dynamics also has
an impact on pc. In fact, the more disagreeing neighbours are needed for a strategy
change, the more critical probability pc approaches the critical probabiity of the
two-dimensional standard percolation pc = 0.592746.
Naturally, the dynamics also affects the appearance of the lattice at the stable
state. In Figure 4.4, the differences in equilibrium for the three processes are illus-
trated. In MVM (Fig. 4.4a), the clusters of both active and inactive nodes are more
compact than in UR or STP (Figs. 4.4b, 4.4c). The stable clusters that survive
either in the sea of inactive nodes or in the land of active nodes are noticeably fewer
and larger as the number of disagreeing neighbours required for strategy change
decreases, while they expand over a smaller range of probabilities.
Apart from the general appearance of the hull, the MVM dynamics on a square
lattice is also responsible for the existence of flicker nodes. Flicker nodes are forced
by the distribution of strategies in their neighbourhood and the adjacent ones to keep
alternating between strategies even after the vast majority of nodes have reached
their local equilibrium. Here we choose to freeze these nodes after a predefined
number of periodic strategy changes. Since their number is very small compared to
the whole network, their freezing to either active or inactive state has no significant
effect on the numerical results. Alternatively, we can choose to run the dynamics
for a few more rounds after freezing the flicker nodes until the system converges to
a new static state. However, this can lead to the addition or removal of chunks of
active nodes that can have an impact on the properties of the percolation hull and
so it is avoided. In any case, the existence of flicker nodes is responsible for adding
extra delays in every simulation run.
It is interesting to explore whether the segregation of same opinion holders has
any effect on other properties of the hull, such as the hull width w and hull length
l. The numerical results on the hull width show a power-law relationship with the
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gradient w ∝ g−aw for all the three processes, MVM (Fig.4.5), UR (Fig.4.6) and
STP (Fig.4.7). In our numerical approach, lattice size Lx is always larger than
width w. In all cases under study, the numerical calculation of exponent aw is in
close agreement with value aσ = 4/7 of Equation (4.1).
Similarly to hull width w, the hull length l exhibits a power-law scaling as a
function of the gradient l ∝ g−al , where the exponent al is in close agreement with
value aN = 3/7 for all the processes under investigation (Figure 4.8). Despite the
same scaling behaviour in the three models, the hull length grows larger as more
disagreeing neighbours are needed for a strategy change for the same gradient g.
This happens because the largest cluster is less tightly woven in UR and STP than
MVM (Fig.4.4) and thus the random walker has to walk around more peninsulas in
order to avoid the lakes of inactive nodes.
Additionally, the ratio aw/al is very close to the critical exponent ν = 4/3 for
the three cases. Based on the hull length and width scaling relationship with the
gradient, as well as their ratio, the results indicate that the phase transition exhibited
by the switching cost model in a gradient is continuous.
It is important to note that the critical behaviour of the MVM process has been
considered elsewhere in the literature where it has been associated with both invasion
percolation with trapping (TIP) [74] and standard percolation [71] in mutually-
exclusive arguments. In our effort to shed some light on the matter, we study the
MVM dynamics in a gradient environment; an approach that no study has pursued
so far. However, our results on the scaling exponents of hull length and width are
inconclusive so far about the conflict, since both TIP and standard percolation are
continuous and have the same exponent ν [84]. We need to further investigate this
and our next approach is to examine the cluster statistics at criticality.
Fractal dimension df
At first, we examine the fractal dimension df of the largest active cluster. To do so
in a gradient environment, we focus on the region around the average position y¯ of
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Figure 4.5: Hull width w versus gradient g for the MVM process. The lines are least-squares
fits to the simulation data. Error bars are smaller than the plot symbols sizes.
10−4 10−3 10−2
101
102
gradient g
Es
tim
at
ed
 v
al
ue
 fo
r w
id
th
 w
 
 
UR
w∝g−0.5683
Figure 4.6: Hull width w versus gradient g for the UR process. The lines are least-squares
fits to the simulation data. Error bars are smaller than the plot symbols sizes.
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Figure 4.7: Hull width w versus gradient g for the STP process. The lines are least-squares
fits to the simulation data. Error bars are smaller than the plot symbols sizes.
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Figure 4.8: Hull length l versus gradient g for the three processes. The lines are least-
squares fits to the simulation data. Error bars are smaller than the plot symbols
sizes.
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Figure 4.9: Average number of largest cluster nodes N in the stripe |y − y¯| < w at the
equilibrium state of the MVM process. Simulation data are represented by
red filled circles and are approximated by least-squares fit represented by black
squares. The least-squares fit gives fractal dimension estimate df = 1.880.
Error bars are smaller than plot symbol sizes.
the hull; in particular the stripe |y − y¯| < w where the system is effectively critical.
We look into squares of size 2w× 2w in the critical region and count the number N
of largest cluster nodes therein.
In a non-gradient lattice of bilateral size L, N scales as a function of L; N ∝ Ldf .
In a gradient, the system size is defined by the hull width w and therefore here we
examine its relationship with N . We studied systems of increasingly larger widths
(and therefore of increasingly smaller gradients) and we averaged out the results of
several independent runs.
It appears that the underlying dynamics (MVM, UR or STP) has no significant
impact on the fractal dimension df of the largest cluster (Figures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11).
The number of the largest cluster nodes that belong in the critical region (i.e. the
stripe |y − y¯| < w) and the relevant system size w increase as gradient g becomes
smaller.
For all the processes under study, the numerical results about the fractal dimension
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Figure 4.10: Average number of largest cluster nodes N in the stripe |y−y¯| < w at the equi-
librium state of the UR process. The least-squares fit gives fractal dimension
estimate df = 1.876.
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Figure 4.11: Average number of largest cluster nodes N in the stripe |y−y¯| < w at the equi-
librium state of the STP process. The least-squares fit gives fractal dimension
estimate df = 1.890.
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Figure 4.12: The distribution of cluster sizes s in the stripe |y − y¯| < w for the MVM
process.
df of the largest cluster are different than the fractal dimension of the invading liquid
in TIP df=1.83 [73]. On the contrary, the estimated value of fractal dimension df
at the limit g → 0 is in good agreement with the fractal dimension df = 1.896 of
two-dimensional standard percolation.
Cluster-size distribution pcs
We look for further evidence of universal behaviour for the three processes in the
cluster size distribution pcs(S). We are interested in clusters that exist in the stripe
|y − y¯| < w, excluding the largest cluster.
The cluster-size distributions pcs(S) are shown in Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14
for MVM, UR and STP respectively. In every case, the distribution pcs(S) scales
with increasing width w, a property that provides solid evidence of a continuous
transition. For small cluster sizes, the MVM and UR cluster-size distributions show
small values that deviate from the curve. This happens because the local rule applied
makes the existence of these cluster sizes very rare. As expected, no deviations from
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Figure 4.13: The distribution of cluster sizes s in the stripe |y− y¯| < w for the UR process.
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Figure 4.14: The distribution of cluster sizes s in the stripe |y−y¯| < w for the STP process.
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the curve are observed in the STP distribution due to the lack of dynamics.
The dashed line in the figures is the least-squares fit that approximates the cluster-
size distribution. In every case, the tangent to the distribution is a power-law curve
with exponent very close to the two-dimensional standard percolation exponent τ =
2.055 [78].
Conclusively, based on numerical results about the hull properties, the fractal di-
mension of the largest cluster and the cluster-size distribution, we have sufficient
evidence to claim that the MVM, UR and STP processes - all derived from the
switching cost model by assuming different cost values - belong to the standard per-
colation universality class.
4.4.2 Early Majority
In the previous subsection, we thoroughly examined the MVM and UR processes
where every node changes state if more than half of the neighbourhood supports
the opposite opinion. If we consider the 4-cell neighbourhood of the square lattice,
the thresholds for these processes translate as three and four disagreeing neighbours
respectively.
Here we consider the early majority (EM) case where the node follows the opinion
of at least two disagreeing neighbours. This is reminiscent of the MVM process
introduced in the previous subsection. Their difference lies in the tie-break rule; in
the MVM process the nodes trust their personal opinions and do not change state
in case of a tie, whereas in the EM they show no confidence in their own beliefs and
therefore adopt the opposite opinion.
The EM dynamics makes the appearance of flicker nodes significantly stronger
than in the MVM process. Here their number is significantly larger than in the
MVM process and they therefore cannot be ignored. We choose to freeze them after
a number of periodic strategy changes and then allow the system to run for a few
additional rounds until it reaches a stable state. In this case, the percolation hull
is a straight line where every active node is connected to three active neighbours
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and one inactive. The absence of fluctuations in the percolation hull indicates that
the hull width and length show no scaling as a function of the gradient. A more
careful handling of the flicker nodes is required for the EM process, but it will not
be addressed in this chapter.
On another note, if we consider the case where a node follows the opinion of at
least one disagreeing neighbour, the system will require only one active node to reach
consensus. In this case, no percolation hull is formed.
In conclusion, we can argue that the switching cost dynamics leads to different
critical behaviour than the processes described in the previous subsection for thresh-
olds less than the majority of the neighbourhood.
4.4.3 Asymmetric switching costs
The results presented in subsection 4.4.1 indicate that the value of symmetric costs
inflicts no impact on the universality class, provided that they contribute to thresh-
olds larger than 0.5. Here we investigate whether the asymmetry in costs has any
impact on the classification of the model.
Based on the processes described in 4.4.1, we construct asymmetric processes with
different thresholds at each change direction. Since we investigate the phase transi-
tions of the non-progressive model, we omit the STP process from the construction
of asymmetric processes. The STP process is related to high costs that prevent any
dynamics from occuring in the system and therefore its involvement in an asym-
metric process leads to lack of dynamics in one direction of strategy change. The
uni-directional type of dynamics is reminiscent of the progressive dynamics intro-
duced in Chapter 3, where its connection with boostrap percolation is also discussed.
For this reason, only the MVM and UR processes are considered for the construc-
tion of the following asymmetric processes:
• MVM&UR: This process dictates that the MVM process is applied only in
the inactive-to-active direction while the UR process is applied at the opposite
direction. This means that an inactive node with more than two active neigh-
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Figure 4.15: Variation of p(y¯) where y¯ the mean value of the hull y-coordinates distribu-
tion as a function of the gradient g for the two asymmetric processes under
study: UR&MVM and MVM&UR. The asterisks correspond to the critical
probability pc, defined as the limit of p(y¯) as g → 0. The error bars represent
the standard deviations obtained on 12000 samples.
bours becomes active and an active node becomes inactive only if surrounded
by inactive nodes.
• UR&MVM: Here the processes applied at the each direction are reversed; an
inactive node becomes active if all of its neighbours are active, while three
inactive neighbours are enough for an active node to change state.
The above description shows that the active nodes are more resistant in the MVM-
UR process. The opposite holds for the UR-MVM process where the inactive nodes
are more likely to survive.
Simulations of these processes were performed for various gradients g and lattice
sizes Lx × Ly and the results of the percolation hull statistics were averaged out
over a large number of independent runs. At first, the average position of the hull
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Figure 4.16: Hull width for the asymmetric processes MVM&UR and UR&MVM.
is used to determine the critical probability pc as g → 0. In Figure 4.15, we ob-
serve that the type of nodes more likely to survive affects the average position of
the hull and consequently the critical probability pc. The MVM&UR process, where
the active nodes are more resistant to change, has estimated critical probability
pc = 0.428, while the critical probability of UR&MVM process is estimated to be
higher (pc = 0.582), showing thus the inactive nodes’ higher immunity. Nonethe-
less, in every dynamical process considered so far - symmetric or asymmetric - the
estimated critical probability pc is always lower than the critical probability of the
two-dimensional standard percolation pc = 0.592746.
The hull width and length follow power-law relationships with the gradient and
their relationship exponent is calculated to be in good agreement with the theoretical
values aσ = 4/7 and aN = 3/7 (Figures 4.16 and 4.17). The numerical values of hull
width and length have very close values to each other, highlighting the equivalence
between the two available node types (active and inactive).
An examination of the fractal dimension df of the largest cluster via the 2w× 2w
square method as described in 4.4.1 gives results that are in close agreement with the
standard percolation df = 1.896. Similarly, numerical results about the cluster-size
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Figure 4.17: Hull length for the asymmetric processes MVM&UR and UR&MVM.
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Figure 4.18: Fractal dimension of the largest cluster in MVM&UR.
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Figure 4.19: Fractal dimension of the largest cluster in UR&MVM.
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Figure 4.20: The distribution of cluster sizes s in the stripe |y− y¯| < w for the MVM&UR
process.
103
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
10−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
N
or
m
al
is
ed
 c
lu
st
er
 s
ize
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
p c
s(s
)
cluster size s
 
 
w=256
w=512
w=1024
w=2048
Pcs∝S−1.9817
Figure 4.21: The distribution of cluster sizes s in the stripe |y− y¯| < w for the UR&MVM
process.
distribution are fitted by a power-law curve with exponent 2.03 for the MVM&UR
process (Figure 4.20) and 1.98 for the UR&MVM process (Figure 4.21). Both values
are very close to the standard percolation cluster-size distribution exponent τ =
2.055.
Based on the evidence above, the asymmetry in cost values leaves the universality
class of the non-progressive switching cost model unaffected and the same as standard
percolation.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the phase transitions exhibited by the non-progressive
switching cost game on a square lattice. Extensive simulations were performed and
various payoff-cost combinations were tried out for this investigation, focusing on
thresholds larger than the majority of the neighbourhood. Instead of considering
uniform activation, we introduced constant gradient in the y-axis so that the nodes’
activation probability depends on their y-coordinates. The introduction of gradient
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was responsible for the formation of the percolation hull; a borderline between the
two spanning clusters. We focused on the properties of the percolation hull and how
they were affected by the switching costs.
The numerical results demonstrated that the critical probability pc, which is re-
lated to the mean position of the percolation hull, depended on the switching cost
values and their symmetry. Independently of the switching costs, the percolation
hull width and length were found to follow a power-law relationship with the gra-
dient with their exponent fraction in good agreement with the standard percolation
exponent ν. The fractal dimension of the largest active cluster and the cluster-size
distribution exponent also remained unaffected by the cost values and the symme-
try between them with their estimated values in good agreement with the standard
percolation relevant values. Conclusively, there is sufficient evidence to support
the claim that the non-progressive switching cost model belongs to the standard
percolation universality class.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Thesis contributions
In this thesis, we studied the effect of switching costs introduced into the standard
coordination game. More precisely, we investigated their impact on the network
equilibrium, on analytical methods that predict the final outcome and on the sta-
tistical properties of clusters of same strategists. As we explain below, the obtained
numerical results demonstrated that the switching costs produce an effect on indi-
viduals’ behaviour that cannot be underestimated.
5.1.1 Networked coordination games with switching costs
At first, simulations of the switching cost game were systematically perfomed on
various network structures. The numerical results indicated that the presence of
switching costs is responsible for the emergence of coexistence region. More precisely,
at regions of initial condition where the standard coordination game converges to
consensus, the switching cost game converges to a stable state where both strategies
survive in unequal proportions.
For the same network structure, the range of this coexistence region depends on
the cost values and on their symmetry. Larger symmetric costs are responsible for
symmetrical expansion of the coexistence region. In the case of asymmetric costs,
the coexistence region also increases when the difference in cost values becomes
larger. However, this does not happen in a symmetric way but at the expense of the
consensus region that relates to the lower switching cost.
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5.1.2 Analytical approach of the diffusion dynamics
The existence of switching costs turns the prediction of the final strategy proportions
even more interesting and necessary. A coupled simulation of the non-progressive
and progressive switching cost games is our first approach to this issue. The numeri-
cal results showed that the progressive outcomes perfectly bound the non-progressive
outcome and that their distance depends on the switching costs.
The boundaries are also analytically calculated by adapting the analytical tech-
nique that calculates the bootstrap percolation outcome in [41] to the progressive
switching cost game dynamics. As a consequence, given the initial condition of the
network (in this case, the random regular graph) and the local dynamics, we can
provide an estimate of the cascade size by predicting the upper and lower bound of
the non-progressive final outcome.
5.1.3 Switching costs and standard percolation
Motivated by the analogy between the progressive switching cost game and bootstrap
percolation, we investigate the phase transitions of the non-progressive model at the
square lattice. For this purpose, we consider gradient activation where every site’s
activation probability depends on its y-coordinate in the lattice, differentiating from
the uniform activation probability used for the previous sets of simulations. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the first time that an opinion model is investigated in a
gradient environment.
Gradient activation is responsible for the formation of the percolation hull, a
borderline between the largest clusters of the available strategies. The critical prob-
ability pc calculated via the mean position of the hull varies for fixed payoff q = 0.5
and different symmetric and asymmetric cost combinations but it never exceeds the
percolation threshold pc = 0.592746. Additionally, numerical results indicate that
the estimated fractal dimension of the largest cluster is in good agreement with the
fractal dimension of the largest cluster in standard percolation (df = 1.89) for every
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cost combination under investigation. Similarly, the cluster-size distribution follows
a power-law curve with estimated exponent very close to the relevant exponent of
standard percolation (τ = 2.055).
Conclusively, even though the value and symmetry of the switching costs affect
the critical probability of the system in a gradient, they produce no effect on the
cluster properties. The universality class of the non-progressive game remains thus
unaffected by the switching costs and it is the same as the universality class of
standard percolation.
5.1.4 Discussion of the results
In Chapter 2, the impact of switching costs on the final proportions of strategies
is examined. Even though the switching cost game has been introduced elsewhere,
a comprehensive numerical approach of the switching cost effect is provided in this
chapter. More systematic investigations of the switching cost effect are performed
here than in [67], including the consideration of asymmetric costs and the combined
effect of network structure and switching cost on the determination of the final
outcome.
Our numerical findings about the switching cost effect in various structures verify
the well-mixed approach of the “coordination under inertia” as analysed in [45] and
[58]. The coexistence region observed in simulations represents the inertia states
introduced by the switching costs. On a different note, if we see the switching cost
effect through the prism of product adoption, the numerical results verify that the
introduction of switching costs turns our neutral preference about a product into
biased [39].
In Chapter 3, the progressive and non-progressive switching cost game are jux-
taposed and a proof by induction shows that the progressive dynamics bound the
non-progressive version. Even though the connection between progressive and non-
progressive switching cost game is mentioned in [67], a more systematic investigation
of the impact of switching costs and network structure on the formation and distance
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between the boundaries is provided in this thesis.
Additionally, the LMF approximation of [41] was applied on random regular
graphs and a different use of it involving the calculation of a de-activation process
outcome was also presented in this thesis.
In Chapter 4, opinion formation in a gradient describes scenarios where the initial
condition of networks is not uniformly random but shows a variation across space.
By performing exhaustive simulations of the system in a gradient, we reached to
the conclusion that the switching cost model belongs to the universality class of
standard percolation. This finding is in contrast to the central tenet of [74], where a
deterministic opinion formation model is found to belong to the invasion percolation
class. Our findings support the argument of [71], where the classification to invasion
percolation is challenged. However, we provide a more detailed investigation of the
critical behaviour of the system and its critical exponents than the one presented in
[71].
5.2 Future Work
In this section, we discuss certain aspects of the switching cost game that can be
generalised to capture the inertia described by the switching costs more effectively.
We also propose two directions for further corroboration of our results.
5.2.1 Generalised switching cost game
In Chapter 2, we considered the switching cost game with constant switching costs
over time and fixed for all players. Based on this assumption, every player pays
the same cost and yields the same benefit for the same strategy change. In real
life, however, individuals have their own preferences and priorities that may even
vary over time. Therefore, a more realistic approach to the decision-making process
would be to consider different switching costs for different players and at different
time periods. This could be achieved either by drawing only the cost values from
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a predefined random distribution as in [58] or by considering random thresholds
without distinguishing the switching cost [41].
In the switching cost game, every player chooses between two available strate-
gies representing firm products; the market dominant and its entrant competitor.
Nevertheless, competition for market share rarely happens in duopolistic settings;
there could be many newly-introduced firm products competing with the established
one. To capture this type of competition, the switching cost could be generalised to
include more than two strategies.
5.2.2 Markov dynamics for the 1T-approximation
In Section 3.3, we briefly described the Markov chain that describes the progressive
dynamics evolution for random graphs [4],[6]. We also included the 1T-approximation
introduced in [67] as a variation of the non-progressive model exhibiting a sort of
monotonicity, unlike the non-progressive model that is non-monotonous.
A modification of the deletion process presented in [6] could successfully describe
the 1T-approximation dynamics. The essence of this modification is the removal of
links between active and inactive vertices since these connections are responsible for
strategy changes in the 1T-approximation. This deletion process terminates where
no more links with the aforementioned property exist; the remaining graph then
consists of two disconnected components including vertices of the same state.
5.2.3 Further investigation of the universality class
To further consolidate that the switching cost model belongs to the standard perco-
lation universality class, we need to examine the phase transitions that the model
undergoes at Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs and Scale-Free networks for various payoff-cost
combinations. However, such an investigation would not contribute to the argument
that the MVM process defined in Section 4.4.1 belongs to the invasion percolation
with trapping (TIP) or standard percolation universality class, since the two percola-
tion phenomena are characterised by the same critical exponents for these networks
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[71],[74],[75].
In Chapter 4, we examined processes similar to the majority voter model [44] but
with different tie-break rules; in case of a tie, the focal node ‘sticks to her own guns’
or she adopts the opposite strategy if the MVM or EM process is followed respec-
tively. If we consider the significant difference in the appearance of the percolation
hull, we understand that the tie break rule is crucial to the evolution of the dy-
namics. Therefore, a more careful examination of the tie break rule by introducing
stochasticity could lead to interesting results.
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